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James Boyle and Jennifer Jenkins** 
In recent years, universities have been accused in news stories 
of becoming “trademark bullies,” entities that use their trademarks 
to harass and intimidate beyond what the law can reasonably be 
interpreted to allow. Universities have also intensified efforts to 
gain expansive new marks. The Ohio State University’s attempt to 
trademark the word “the” is probably the most notorious. There has 
also been criticism of universities’ attempts to use their trademarks 
to police clearly legal speech about their activities. But beyond pro-
vocative anecdotes, how can one assess whether a particular uni-
versity is truly bullying, since there are entirely legitimate reasons 
for universities—like all trademark holders—to assert their rights? 
Online “rankings” of trademark bullies have obscure methodolo-
gies. We lack both an empirical account of major aspects of the 
landscape, and a rigorous case study giving individualized, almost 
ethnographic, information about what the accused academic trade-
mark bullies think they are doing. What are their legal arguments 
and how would impartial experts assess those claims? What is their 
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intellectual property worldview, their idea of the role that trade-
marks have in the university’s mission? 
In this Article, we attempt to provide an answer to those ques-
tions. We conducted the first empirical study of a prominent univer-
sity’s trademark assertion practice—both the legitimate exercise 
and defense of its brands and conduct that strays over the line into 
bullying. To do this, we took the university popularly identified as 
the number one collegiate trademark bully and conducted a com-
parative empirical ranking of its behavior as compared to other 
classes of universities—academically elite institutions, major sports 
programs and so on—to find out if any of these categories were pre-
dictors of aggressive trademark assertion. Second, we hand-coded 
every single trademark opposition filed by the alleged bully over a 
four-year period, assigning each one a numerical merit score. We 
also analyzed the arguments that the university provided, thus al-
lowing us not merely to identify whether this was a true case of bul-
lying, but what the alleged bully had to say for itself. Unfortunately, 
the accused bully is our own university, Duke. Is Duke an outlier or 
a bellwether? There are reasons to suspect the latter. After as-
sessing a variety of possible explanations for anomalous aggressive-
ness in trademark assertion, ranging from legal change and licens-
ing culture to behavioral economics, the Article concludes with sug-
gestions for reform, both of the law and of university practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In August of 2019, news came out that The Ohio State Univer-
sity was trying to trademark the word “The” for use on “clothing, 
namely, t-shirts, baseball caps and hats.”1 The internet predictably 
exploded. At time of writing, the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (“PTO”) issued a non-final office action denying the 
application for the word “The,” but the university has time to re-
spond and the mark still registers as “Live” in the PTO’s Trademark 
Electronic Search System.2 
The Ohio State University is not alone. Boise State University 
has claimed that it owns the right to control the use of all non-green 
sporting fields.3 The purported legal grounds for this are as garishly 
strange as Boise State’s own blue football field. The University of 
Texas has claimed the “horns” hand sign.4 Universities have entered 
 
1 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88/571,984 (filed Aug. 8, 2019). 
2 See id. 
3 “The mark consists of the color blue used on the artificial turf in the stadium. The 
matter shown in broken lines on the drawing shows positioning of the mark and is not 
claimed as a feature of the mark,” Registration No. 3,707,623; see Sam Fortier, Boise State 
Mounts a Paper Defense of Its Home Turf, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/boise-state-mounts-a-paper-
defense-of-its-home-turf.html [https://perma.cc/52UH-QGGU] (describing Boise State’s 
expansion of its trademark claim from blue fields to non-green fields). 
4 “The mark consists of a human hand with the index and small fingers extended 
upward and the thumb closed over the middle and ring fingers,” Registration No. 4,535,612 
(May 27, 2014); see generally Complaint, Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Weir, 2013 
WL 419832 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-00071) (The lawsuit filed against the producer 
of merchandise featuring “heavy metal horns” was premised on a pending application for 
the 2014 registered mark; the University has since opposed many other uses of the “horns” 
sign.). 
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the beer market, selling branded brews to their fans.5 There has also 
been criticism of universities’ attempts to use their trademarks to 
police clearly legal speech about them. These include efforts to pre-
vent the release of content that cast their universities in a negative 
light, such as the film “Stealing Stanford”—the writers changed it 
to “Stealing Harvard”—and the TV program “Felicity” which sug-
gested that a fictional, sexually active college student went to NYU.6 
Sexually active college students! What could be more ludicrous? 
The writers changed the identity of the college.7 
What is going on here? When we see famous commercial brands 
over-assiduously wielding their trademarks, we are unsurprised. But 
why universities? A 2018 Associated Press story with the title 
Trademark Bullies? Many Big Colleges Fiercely Protect Brands 
suggests that the phenomenon is a pervasive one: 
Never get between a university and its trademarks. 
That’s the lesson dozens of people learn every year 
when they unwittingly provoke the wrath of big uni-
versities and the lawyers they hire to protect their 
mascots, slogans and logos. Records gathered by The 
Associated Press show that some major universities 
send their lawyers after even slight perceived threats 
to their brands, sending flurries of letters threatening 
legal action or trying to block new trademarks 
deemed too close to their own. Schools say they’re 
only defending themselves from merchandise coun-
terfeiters and others looking to exploit their brands 
for personal gain. But some legal experts say it often 
amounts to trademark bullying, a term used when 
bigger institutions use aggressive tactics to over-
power their opponents in seemingly frivolous dis-
putes. And according to some lawyers, it appears to 
 
5 See Billy Witz, Beer, Here: Merchandising of College Sports Leads to Team-Branded 
Ales, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/sports/ 
ncaafootball/beer-here-the-merchandising-of-college-sports-leads-to-team-branded-
ales.html [https://perma.cc/GD5R-6757]. 
6 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 
420–21 (2010) (discussing “Stealing Stanford” and “Felicity” examples). 
7 See id. 
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be getting more common. As the biggest universities 
bring in growing sums of money through licensing 
deals that rely on their brands, some are becoming 
increasingly aggressive in their efforts to protect 
their symbols.8 
The difficulty with the claims made about university trademark 
bullies is that they are anecdotal. There seems to be something going 
on, but what? The scholarly literature provides no clear answer. A 
trademark bully was once defined by the PTO as “a trademark owner 
that uses its trademark rights to harass and intimidate another busi-
ness beyond what the law might be reasonably interpreted to al-
low.”9 Yet how can one assess whether a particular university is 
truly bullying, when there are entirely legitimate reasons for univer-
sities—like all trademark holders—to assert their rights? Online 
“rankings” of trademark bullies have obscure methodologies. We 
 
8 See Collin Binkley, Trademark Bullies? Many Big Colleges Fiercely Protect Brands, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 28, 2018),  https://www.apnews.com/c23ab691c80a49c7ac94 
0d4611e5d6c6 [https://perma.cc/R9QF-LGSH]. 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF COM., REPORT TO CONGRESS: TRADEMARK LITIGATION TACTICS AND 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND PREVENT 
COUNTERFEITING 15, n.51 (2011), available at  https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ 
files/trademarks/notices/TrademarkLitigationStudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7QM-U2V2] 
[hereinafter “REPORT TO CONGRESS”]. There is an ironic backstory to the definition. 
Senator Leahy of Vermont was outraged when Monster Energy drinks opposed an 
application for the mark “Vermonster” for beer. He asked the PTO to investigate the 
practice of trademark bullying. See id. at 1. The PTO then used the definition we quote 
above in a request for comments about the prevalence of bullying. In the final report, 
however, the PTO later decided (we are not saying “was bullied”) to soften the language 
considerably. See id. at 15 n.51. 
It is noted that in USPTO’s request for comments posted on October 6, 2010, 
the term “bullies” was used and described as “a trademark owner that uses its 
trademark rights to harass ad [sic] intimidate another business beyond what the 
law might be reasonably interpreted to allow.” The posting was later amended 
to remove the terminology “bullies” and “bullying,” as it was determined that 
it was more appropriate to use the language appearing in the Trademark 
Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, namely, “litigation 
tactics.”  
See id. The idea that this chain of events might seem to confirm the existence of a problem 
appears not to have occurred to those involved. Assessment of the PTO’s report was 
scathing. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Department of Commerce Releases Worthless Report on 
Trademark Bullying, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011), 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/04/department_of_c.htm 
[https://perma.cc/BWH9-55AG]. 
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lack both an empirical account of major aspects of the landscape, 
and a rigorous case study giving individualized information about 
what the accused bullies think they are doing. What are their legal 
arguments and how would impartial experts assess those claims? 
What is their intellectual property worldview—their idea of the role 
that trademarks have in the university’s mission? 
In this Article, we attempt to provide an answer to some of those 
questions. We conducted the first multi-year empirical study of a 
prominent university’s trademark assertion practice—both the legit-
imate exercise and defense of its brands and conduct that strays over 
the line into bullying. To do so, we took the university popularly 
identified as the number one collegiate trademark bully10 and con-
ducted a comparative empirical ranking of its behavior as compared 
to other classes of universities—academically elite institutions, ma-
jor sports programs, and so on—to find out if any of these categories 
were predictors of aggressive trademark assertion. Second, we hand-
coded every trademark opposition filed by the alleged bully over a 
four-year period, assigning each one a numerical merit score. We 
also analyzed the arguments which the university provided, thus al-
lowing us not merely to identify whether this was a true case of bul-
lying, but what the alleged bully had to say for itself. Unfortunately, 
and we say this with no pleasure, the alleged bully is our own uni-
versity, Duke. 
As this Article will show, Duke is an outlier. Its level of aggres-
sion, both in number of claims and the extremity of its legal argu-
ments, is remarkable. Outliers are a poor basis for generalizations 
about a field. On the other hand, we saw some evidence in our study 
that Duke might be a front-runner rather than a mere statistical 
anomaly; its behavior today suggesting the way that other universi-
ties may act in the future. While Duke’s aggressive trademark op-
position practice has no peer, several other universities have begun 
to move in the same direction. What is more, Duke’s arguments and 
the worldview they represent—gleaned from hundreds of legal fil-
ings—seem to represent a trend in universities’ thinking about 
 
10 See Year 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 Biggest Bullies, TRADEMARKIA, 
https://www.trademarkia.com/opposition/bully-duke-university?fn=Duke+University 
[https://perma.cc/3B8H-SKYK] [hereinafter Biggest Bullies]. 
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trademarks and their relationship to the role of a university in to-
day’s world. The latter finding is perhaps the most disturbing one. 
The Article begins with two empirical studies, one comparative 
and one merit-based, that provide a more structured and replicable 
assessment of trademark bullying. In the process, the Article as-
sesses the trademark assertiveness of three different university-
based categories: (i) the top ten academically ranked schools; (ii) the 
top ten university athletic programs in terms of revenue or valuation 
of their athletic program, and (iii) the top ten schools in terms of 
basketball revenue.11 Part II then moves to the substance of the ar-
guments put forward to justify Duke’s particular trademark asser-
tions, seeking to identify the assumptions behind them and the vi-
sion of the university’s role and mission they offer. Is Duke an out-
lier or a bellwether? Part III assesses a variety of possible explana-
tions for anomalous aggressiveness in trademark assertion, ranging 
from legal change to behavioral economics, and the Article con-
cludes with some suggestions for reform—both of the law and of 
university practices. 
I. A CASE STUDY IN TRADEMARK BULLYING 
Duke University, where the authors of this Article teach, appears 
in many lists of rankings. The undergraduate university is #12 on 
the US News and World Reports list.12 The law school is also #12.13 
The men’s basketball team is perennially close to #1.14 So it might 
not be a surprise when, from 2014-2017, Duke came in each year at 
#2 nationally in yet another ranking. Unfortunately, the category 
 
11 The sources of these rankings are discussed infra Part I. 
12 2021 Best National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept. 2020), 
https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities 
[https://perma.cc/ZL3C-VSJ2]. 
13 2021 Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept. 2020), 
https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings 
[https://perma.cc/RK7P-P6WR]. 
14 As of November 2019, the Duke men’s basketball team had been ranked No. 1 in the 
Associated Press poll for 143 weeks all-time. Since this sounds like mere bragging, we 
wish to insist that this statistic was inserted only because of the laudable concern that the 
editors of this law journal have for punctilious accuracy. See, e.g., Men’s Basketball AP 
Poll, USA TODAY (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/sports/ncaab/polls/ap-
poll/2019-2020/2019-11-25/ [https://perma.cc/62WY-Y3J4]. 
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was not academic or athletic excellence: Duke was named the #2 
“trademark bully” in the United States by the search engine Trade-
markia, second only to the famously litigious Monster Energy fran-
chise.15 This is not just a ranking of universities. Duke was named 
the #2 bully out of all trademark owners. As we mention above, a 
trademark bully was once defined by the PTO as “a trademark owner 
that uses its trademark rights to harass and intimidate another busi-
ness beyond what the law might be reasonably interpreted to al-
low.”16 Happily, Duke has slipped a little on that list—it was only 
#7 amongst trademark bullies nationally in 2018.17 So, why would 
a university be a trademark bully? 
We came to this issue as skeptics. On the intellectual property 
issues we knew about, Duke seemed respectful of the boundary be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate assertions of rights. True, there 
were many reports about Duke being a trademark bully.18 There 
 
15 Biggest Bullies, supra note 10. To find the listing for the relevant year, use the “Year 
of” drop-down menu.  
16 See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 9. 
17 Year 2018 Biggest Bullies, TRADEMARKIA, 
https://www.trademarkia.com/opposition/bully-duke-university?fn=Duke+University 
[https://perma.cc/3B8H-SKYK]. In 2019, Duke was #8 on Trademarkia’s biggest bullies 
list. Id. However, the fall may not be because Duke is less assertive, but because other 
trademark holders are more so. In 2015, Duke filed twenty-three oppositions and was 
ranked as the #2 trademark bully. In 2018, Duke filed thirty oppositions and was ranked as 
#7 on the bullies list. In 2019, it filed thirty-one and was ranked at #8. 2019 is not part of 
our study, but the quality of the oppositions seems comparable to the period we looked at. 
18 See, e.g., Bill Donahue, How NCAA March Madness Schools Protect Their 
Trademarks, LAW 360 (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1140684/how-
ncaa-march-madness-schools-protect-their-trademarks [https://perma.cc/2UEG-R42S] 
(“In the year since the 2018 tournament ended, the Blue Devils have filed a whopping 33 
new cases at TTAB over applications for trademarks involving ‘Duke,’ ‘Blue’ or 
‘Devil’…That rate of new cases is exceptional: No other big school has filed more than a 
handful of cases over the past year. But it’s old hat for Duke, which is known as a litigious 
trademark owner.”); Erik Pelton, Is Duke University a Champion Trademark Bully? 
PELTON BLOG (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.erikpelton.com/is-duke-university-champion-
trademark-bully/ [https://perma.cc/85UY-2CAN] (“I don’t throw around the phrase 
‘trademark bully’ lightly. But to me there is no question that Duke is arguably in that 
category.”); Bill McCarthy, ‘One of the most visible brand names’: University Has Already 
Filed 6 Trademark Oppositions This Year, THE CHRONICLE (Mar. 14, 2018, 7:24 AM), 
https://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2018/03/one-of-the-most-visible-brand-names-
university-has-already-filed-6-trademark-oppositions-this-year [https://perma.cc/R78Y-
4Z43] (discussing Duke’s opposition practices in Duke’s university newspaper); Steve 
 
2021] MARK OF THE DEVIL 399 
 
were still puzzling stories about Duke’s trademark oppositions.19 
But that left us with a war of competing anecdotes and opaque online 
rankings, countered by robust defenses from those in charge of li-
censing at the university. The AP story quotes the Duke official re-
sponsible; “‘We find it’s much easier to proactively prevent confu-
sion than to cure it after it happens,’ said Jim Wilkerson, the school’s 
director of trademark licensing.”20 The Duke Chronicle recently ran 
a story about Duke’s trademark oppositions which included a simi-
lar defense: 
Michael Schoenfeld, vice president of public affairs 
and government relations…explained that the Office 
of General Counsel is always working to protect the 
school’s name, logo and brand…“Duke is one of the 
most visible brand names in higher education,” 
Schoenfeld wrote in an email. “The University vig-
orously defends our trademarks and other legal pro-
tections to avoid confusion in the public and to en-
sure that Duke’s name and images are protected from 
misuse.”21 
How can one know if a university is a trademark bully? There 
are two obstacles to answering the question. First, trademark owners 
have entirely legitimate reasons to challenge conduct infringing 
their marks. Trademarks may be central to a company’s worth and 
 
Brachmann, College, University Trademark Enforcement Campaigns Not a New 
Phenomenon, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 25, 2018),  
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/09/25/college-university-trademark-enforcement-
campaigns-are-not-new-phenomenon-says-trademark-attorney/id=101443 
[https://perma.cc/57XW-KAET] (“[T]he most active academic institution in terms of 
trademark enforcement efforts might be Duke University….”). 
19 In 2014, Duke’s trademark practices made national news after Duke opposed an 
application by the heirs of John Wayne, whose nickname was “Duke,” to register “Duke” 
for “alcoholic beverages except beers, all in connection with indicia denoting the late 
internationally known movie star John Wayne, who is also known as Duke.” DUKE, 
Registration No. 5,161,307; see also Gail Sullivan, John Wayne and Duke University in 
Dispute over ‘Duke’ Bourbon, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 10, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/07/10/john-wayne-and-
duke-university-in-dispute-over-duke-bourbon/ [https://perma.cc/7G56-NB9B]. Wayne’s 
heirs were eventually able to register the mark with minor changes. 
20 Binkley, supra note 8. 
21 McCarthy, supra note 18. 
400 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387 
 
brand recognition, a central component of its marketing strategy. 
Second, trademark owners rightly point out that, if they wish to 
maintain those marks, they are actually required to assert their 
rights. Continued use is a requirement for trademark protection: 
while acquiescence to infringing behavior may not be enough to 
meet abandonment’s high standard, if a court finds clear and con-
vincing evidence of abandonment—generally intentional abandon-
ment—then loss of a trademark could result.22 However, this re-
quirement is often used to justify aggressive behavior that the law 
neither requires nor supports. Trademark law only requires policing 
the actual boundaries of the mark, not speculative claims far afield 
from it.23 Duke could put its trademarks at risk if it remained silent 
in the face of someone starting a Duke College of Medicine, or a 
Blue Devil basketball camp. It would not do so by acquiescing in 
the registration of “The Dude Diet” for a diet-related website. To let 
that pass is not abandonment, it is simply refraining from abuse. The 
actual risks of abandonment turn out to be exaggerated.24 Yet, all 
this merely restates the question. Was Duke legitimately asserting 
its rights or going beyond the legitimate defense of its mark into 
bullying? Abstract analysis could not reliably distinguish one from 
the other.  
In addition, the methodologies for the online bullying rankings 
are not clearly explained. For example, one cannot simply use the 
number of oppositions to measure bullying. Trademark oppositions 
can be justified. Well-known brands might have more potential im-
itators and thus a larger stake in policing the boundaries of their 
marks. To the extent that Duke was aggressively asserting its rights, 
 
22 15 U.S.C. § 1127; 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17.17 (5th ed. 2020). 
23 “The owner of a mark is not required to police every conceivably related use thereby 
needlessly reducing non-competing commercial activity and encouraging litigation in 
order to protect a definable area of primary importance.” Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Chuckleberry Pub., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414, 422–23 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
24 See Jessica Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in 
Trademark Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 212, 229 (2014) (“While 
trademark owners routinely cite the duty to police as justification for their bully-like 
behavior, the actual risk of losing one’s trademark rights due to a failure to police third 
party trademark use appears to be highly exaggerated. In the majority of cases in which a 
failure to police third party trademark usage is alleged, courts find that any such failure has 
not risen to the level of abandonment of the mark and thus is inconsequential.”). 
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perhaps the difference in behavior was explained by endogenous 
variables such as Duke’s academic prestige or the athletic excel-
lence of its sports teams. 
With all that in mind, we decided to bring more rigor to the ques-
tion of determining whether a university is a trademark bully by 
studying it empirically. Whatever the result, we assumed, we would 
learn a lot about the contemporary world of academic brands, and 
the boundaries of trademark law as seen from a licensing office. 
Since trademark bullies are accused of not only abusing the legal 
system, but of causing harms to legitimate speech and economic 
competition,25 this promised to have wider significance than the 
malfeasance or innocence of an individual school. What’s more, be-
cause the oppositions or cancellations must be publicly filed, we 
could determine exactly what kinds of legal claims an alleged uni-
versity trademark bully was making. That would offer some valua-
ble insights about the boundaries of trademark law as seen by its 
most conspicuous users and consumers. In other words, whatever 
the result of the bullying inquiry, Duke would be a fascinating test 
case. 
As a result, we conducted the first empirical study of a univer-
sity’s trademark assertion practice—both the legitimate exercise and 
defense of its brands and conduct that strays over the line into bul-
lying. Our empirical study had two parts: (1) a comparative ranking 
of Duke against other schools (the “Comparative Study”) and (2) a 
hand-coding of the legal merit of the positions that Duke took and 
the arguments that it made (the “Merit Study”). For the Comparative 
Study, taking a four-year period from 2015-2018, we compared the 
number of trademark oppositions that Duke initiated to those of sim-
ilarly situated schools on a number of dimensions. For the Merit 
Study, we coded every trademark opposition or cancellation raised 
by Duke over the same period, assigning each one a numerical score 
based on its legal merit. 
 
25 See generally id.; Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right-
of-Publicity Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1293 (2016); Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark 
Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625 (2011); William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright 
Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453 
(2012); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 17.17 (5th ed. 2020). 
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In both cases, our focus was on trademark oppositions: the pro-
cess in front of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) 
where trademark owners can oppose applications for federal trade-
mark registration by other entities. This step happens only after an 
examiner has already approved the potential mark for publication, 
meaning that the most problematic or confusing marks have already 
been weeded out. If someone attempted to register “Niky” for ath-
letic shoes, or “Dook Blu Devils” for basketball apparel, the exam-
iner would almost certainly deny the mark at an earlier stage. How-
ever, if the registration got to the point of publication, Nike and 
Duke could file an opposition if the registration was pending, or a 
cancellation if the registration has been granted.26 
Why focus on trademark oppositions and cancellations? Nor-
mally we are consumers rather than producers of empirical scholar-
ship. We had teasingly mocked other empirical studies for their ten-
dency to look for the lost car keys only under the light of the lamp-
post. Yet we found ourselves eager to defend the little patch of pave-
ment under our own lamppost. How the sidewalk shone! 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to focus on that patch of 
pavement. First, the phrase “trademark bully” is traditionally asso-
ciated with trademark oppositions; it was in that context that the 
phrase was developed. Second, trademark oppositions are public 
documents with (ostensible) reasons provided within them. In this 
Article, we will describe other stories of trademark overreach, but 
those stories come with no requirement of a formal, public statement 
of legal reasoning. With oppositions and cancellations, however, the 
opposing party must state a legal argument. Thus, one could not 
merely count events, one could classify reasoning. If Duke were to 
be abusing trademark law, we would effectively be able to go inside 
the mind of a trademark bully. We might be able to understand and 
to dissect its legal consciousness in a way that promised to have 
 
26 This point deserves considerable emphasis: these oppositions or cancellations only 
occur after the PTO’s examiner has already approved a mark for publication, having 
checked to see if it is so similar to an existing mark as to create a likelihood of confusion, 
and thus should be refused registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). For an entity to be 
opposing marks at a high rate thus indicates either an understanding of the boundaries of 
trademark law very different than the PTO’s, or a belief that the PTO routinely commits 
errors in applying the law, or both. 
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general significance beyond the parochial question of one univer-
sity’s conduct. Finally, in Duke’s case, there were many opposi-
tions, over multiple years, and each of them cost money. Talk is 
cheap—but lawyer-talk, let alone lawyer-talk in an official proceed-
ing, is not. These were (i) expensive and thus presumably (ii) care-
fully considered (iii) reasoned legal arguments (iv) provided in the 
context of a formal proceeding with associated professional norms 
and ethical sanctions for misstatements. Accordingly, it seemed as 
if they might provide a more revealing portrait of doctrinal and in-
stitutional positions on which a brand owner was willing to stake 
money and reputation. This was not mere brand-bloviation. 
There are hundreds of ways in which entities, including univer-
sities, can make overreaching trademark claims. We discuss some 
of the others later in this Article. Formal oppositions probably do 
not perfectly mirror that larger reality, and if they did, how would 
one know? But our case study lays out a carefully considered,  
expensively generated, large, and publicly stated set of views of 
trademark law by a major university which is a conspicuous con-
sumer of trademark doctrine and policy. That set of views and  
actions can be compared to those of university peers and ranked—
both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is also morally consequen-
tial: a university is calling on the state to prevent other entities from 
using language and symbols that are arguably in the public domain. 
For those reasons, we believe it is revealing. We hope it also pro-
vides a prototype for future empirical examination of alleged bully-
ing and brings more clarity to a debate currently dominated by  
anecdote and assertion. 
A. The Comparative Study 
Our hypothesis in this portion of the study was that if the need 
to police a trademark assiduously were related to some endogenous 
variable—say, academic rank and prestige or the financial returns of 
a school’s athletic programs—then similarly situated universities 
would exhibit similar behavior. Thus, if one could find the relevant 
comparison set, one could come up with a rating of the university’s 
performance relative to the appropriate peer group. We used three 
categories: 
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(i) The top ten academically ranked schools, drawn from the 
2018 US News and World Report survey of universities;27 
(ii) The top ten university athletic programs in terms of revenue 
or valuation of their athletic program—we used NCAA data from 
2016-2017 provided by USA Today.28 Duke is not part of that 
group; and 
(iii) The top ten schools in terms of basketball revenue.29  
We used all three so as not to prejudge the relevant comparison 
set. Perhaps academically elite schools felt more need to assert their 
brands aggressively. Perhaps the billions of dollars generated by col-
lege athletics produce both abundant licensing opportunities and ea-
ger free riders who need to be beaten back by the university’s attor-
neys. Or perhaps there is something special about basketball, a sport 
traditionally associated with Duke. Unfortunately, in each case, the 












27 See 2018 Best National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept. 
2017); Monikah Schuschu, The 2018 U.S News and World Report College Rankings: What 
You Need to Know, COLLEGEVINE (Oct. 24, 2017), https://blog.collegevine.com/the-2018-
u-s-news-and-world-report-college-rankings-what-you-need-to-know/ 
[https://perma.cc/A4VH-5QCN]. 
28 See Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Finances, USA TODAY, https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20190319022759/https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (on file with journal).  
29 See Chris Smith, The Most Valuable College Basketball Teams, FORBES (Mar. 12, 
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2019/03/12/the-most-valuable-college-
basketball-teams/ [https://perma.cc/BR78-XDMC].  
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Total Oppositions & Cancellations 2015-2018 
Top 10 Schools Academically 
 
The thesis that academically highly-ranked schools would ex-
hibit similar behavior was clearly falsified. Duke filed 136 proceed-
ings over the period 2015-2018. By comparison, the remaining 
schools in the top ten list, combined, filed a total of seven. What’s 
more, examination of those oppositions indicated that they were 
generally modest and grounded in existing law. Duke’s behavior, 
then, could not be explained by its academic prestige. 
Next, we looked at the top ten schools in terms of athletic reve-
nue earned, as measured by the NCAA’s required financial disclo-
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Total Oppositions & Cancellations 2015-2018 
Top 10 by 2016-17 Athletic Revenues (plus Duke) 30 
Here, for the first time, we saw some evidence of correlation be-
tween ranking and the aggressiveness of trademark assertion. How-
ever, even here, Duke was an outlier. Texas, at thirty oppositions, 
was itself unusual, with the closest counterpart being Ohio State at 
eleven. Duke’s 136 oppositions again dwarfed its potential compar-
ison schools. Excluding Duke, the mean was 6.8. Duke thus filed 
exactly twenty times as many oppositions as the mean for this group. 
Indeed, Duke filed more than twice as many oppositions as all of the 
other schools combined. This is remarkable given the amount of 
money those top ten schools were earning. Texas’s athletic pro-
grams, ranked 1st, earned $214,830,647 in 2016-2017. Duke’s num-
bers were not given in USA Today’s list, but for the 2015-2016 
 
30 Berkowitz et al., supra note 28. However, we also looked at a larger set of schools 
and at different data about football programs alone, in case those affected the result. The 
same pattern was revealed. 
2021] MARK OF THE DEVIL 407 
 
season, Duke reported earning $91,971,836 and it was 37th in that 
year’s rankings.31 Thus it seems that there is an association between 
large athletic programs and trademark assertiveness, but that the as-
sociation is a loose one, with wide variability in behavior. Duke re-
mains an outlier. 
Next, we turned to a comparison with the ten most economically 
valuable basketball programs, in case something about that sport 
produced unusual behavior in either licensing or free-riding.32 
Again, Duke was a remarkable outlier, filing 8.5 times as many op-














32 The list was based on a ranking compiled by Forbes Magazine that covers a similar 
period to that of our study. It has some oddities to a basketball fan’s eyes—financial success 
and success on the court are not always correlated. Booster donations play a big role. 
However, the top ten list we extracted from Forbes’ data does include three of the five 
NCAA men’s basketball champions from 2014-2018: Connecticut (2014), Duke (2015) 
and Louisville (2016). The winners in 2017 (UNC, #11 on the Forbes list) and 2018 
(Villanova, unranked) also had low rates of opposition. The methodology of the study is 
described thus: “Our ranking of college basketball’s most-valuable teams is based on three-
year average revenues across the 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 seasons (ties in revenue 
were broken using average profits). To determine team revenues and expenses, we relied 
on annual filings made by each school’s athletic department to the NCAA and the 
Department of Education. We also made adjustments to individual line items like 
contributions, media rights, and sponsorships to adjust for differences in accounting 
practices among athletic departments. (The three private schools on our list—Duke, 
Syracuse and Marquette—declined to share financial details beyond those published by the 
Department of Education.)” Smith, supra note 29. 
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In short, whatever the comparison set, Duke’s aggressiveness in 
policing its marks is strikingly anomalous. If we added together all 
schools on all three of our lists—Ohio State appears twice and was 
not double-counted—Duke is still filing 39% more oppositions than 
the other schools in all three categories combined: 136 to 98. Duke 
may indeed be “one of the most visible brand names in higher edu-
cation” but it is hardly more visible than Harvard, Yale, Stanford, 
MIT, Princeton, Texas, Alabama, Michigan, LSU, Kentucky, Ohio 
State, Auburn, and sixteen others put together. The non-Duke mean 
number of oppositions during our study period for academically 
elite schools was 0.7, for top athletic schools, 6.8, and for top bas-
ketball schools, 3.78. We can see a few other universities beginning 
to assert their marks aggressively. For example, the University of 
Texas filed 4.4 times as many oppositions as the mean for its group. 
Nevertheless, Duke’s lead was unchallenged.   
B. The Merit Study 
1. Background 
The Comparative Study focused on raw numbers. Nevertheless, 
at the end of the day, this study shows only that Duke is an outlier. 
It does not show that Duke was incorrect in its actions, though it 
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casts doubt on that idea. It is possible that Duke is right about the 
optimal level of assertion of its marks, and that the other twenty-
eight universities we looked at, all of whom have sophisticated law-
yers and engage actively in trademark licensing, are in error. In or-
der to assess that possibility, we hand-coded every trademark oppo-
sition or cancellation raised by Duke over the period 2015-2018 and 
assigned each one a numerical score based on its legal merit. 
In the process, we gathered a great deal of information in our 
larger project, one that goes beyond Duke to the questions about 
universities and intellectual property raised in the introduction. 
Duke is a conspicuous consumer and user of trademark law: how 
has such an entity come to understand the boundaries of these intel-
lectual property rights? What arguments does it make? What is the 
“vision” underlying its actions? How does it see its role as a univer-
sity in the production and delivery of trademarked goods and ser-
vices? What relationship does that role play to the traditional one of 
a university? How do its actions play into the so-called “permissions 
culture”33—the practice of asserting intellectual property rights go-
ing far beyond existing legal doctrine? In other areas, scholars claim 
that these practices, if they become pervasive, are capable of trans-
forming a field of culture (for example, copyright holders attempting 
to minimize or eliminate fair use) or science (for example, patent 
trolls using illegitimate patent claims to extract unearned rents) even 
though the practices have no legal foundation. Could that be true 
here? These are questions of substantially greater reach and im-
portance than the question of whether Duke is guilty or innocent of 
bullying. 
Oppositions are the processes in front of the TTAB where trade-
mark owners can oppose applications for Federal trademark 
 
33 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 8, 99, 192–93 (2004); KEITH 
AOKI, JAMES BOYLE, AND JENNIFER JENKINS, TALES FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: BOUND BY 
LAW? (2006) (exploring the permissions culture in documentary film); KEMBREW MCLEOD 
& PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 98–
99, 119–20 (2011) (examining the pervasive permissions culture in digital sampling). 
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registration.34 As we noted earlier, these proceedings only occur af-
ter the PTO’s examiner has already approved a mark for publication, 
having checked to see if it is too similar to existing marks or should 
be denied for other reasons. The examining attorney is not always 
correct. If someone is trying to register “Cameron Krzyz” for im-
printing on apparel (the trademarked nickname for Duke basketball 
fans is “Cameron Crazies”), Duke has every right to oppose that reg-
istration.35 It did so, entirely justifiably. In fact, it is required to op-
pose potentially infringing marks under some circumstances if it 
wishes to preserve its own marks, though, as we pointed out earlier, 
trademark owners often overstate how far the law requires them to 
go in policing their mark. 
But oppositions can also verge on the frivolous: Duke opposed 
“Pretty Devil” for electronic slot machines (Duke’s sports teams are 
called “Blue Devils”).36 It opposed “Blue Ball Chiller” for alcoholic 
beverages and “Get Your Blue On!” for charitable fundraising.37 
You might think that a “Do Your Dooty!!—Major Duke” design of 
a saluting soldier seated on a toilet as a trademark for toilet deodor-
ant and a toilet footstool, was at worst, in poor taste.38 Duke opposed 
it, as it did “Geek’d” for clothing items, “Beach’d” for beach bags 
and cosmetic bags, “i-D” for providing travel, health, and fashion 
information, “D’Grill” for barbecue smokers and grills, and “Blue-
food” for various food products.39 
 
34 15 U.S.C. § 1063; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1503.01 (Oct. 2018), available at 
https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current#/current/TMEP-1500d1e181.html 
[https://perma.cc/V654-349K]. 
35 CAMERON KRZYZ, Opp’n No. 91,229,209 (filed July 27, 2016). 
36 PRETTY DEVIL, Opp’n No. 91,222,305 (filed June 10, 2015). 
37 BLUE BALL CHILLER, Opp’n No. 91,220,755 (filed Feb. 23, 2015); GET YOUR 
BLUE ON!, Opp’n No. 91,225,159 (filed Dec. 2, 2015). 
38 DO YOUR DOOTY!!—MAJOR DUKE, Opp’n No. 91,238,525 (filed Dec. 20, 
2017). 
39 GEEK’D, Opp’n. No. 91,233,509 (filed Mar. 21, 2017); BEACH’D, Opp’n. No. 
91,234,084 (filed Apr. 19, 2017); I-D, Opp’n. No. 91,233,282 (filed Mar. 1, 2017); 
D’GRILL, Opp’n. No. 91,234,213 (filed Apr. 26, 2017); BLUEFOOD, Opp’n. No. 
91,235,393 (filed July 5, 2017). One of our superb research assistants pointed out that 
Duke’s grounds of opposition included the fact that this mark was purely descriptive—
presumably, if the food were to be blue—and mis-descriptive, presumably if it were not. 
At present, Duke does not claim a mark over “Catch 22.” 
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Duke routinely opposes, or at least asks for an extension to file 
a possible opposition against, marks that contain the word Duke, or 
sound like Duke, regardless of the type of goods or services the 
marks seek to protect. That is not the way that trademarks work. As 
we will explain below, a trademark is not a right in gross over a 
word, but rather a protection of a particular mark in connection with 
a particular set of goods and services. More strangely still, Duke also 
regularly opposes trademarks containing the word “Devil,” the word 
“Blue,” or consisting of the letter “D,” standing alone, or in combi-
nation with another letter. As we will explain—under well-estab-
lished principles of law—that goes beyond the bounds of reasonable 
trademark assertion. 
How does one judge whether a brand owner is a bully? Though 
trademark owners often seem to believe otherwise, a trademark does 
not convey the absolute ownership of a word or a symbol.40 Subject 
to some limitations we shall explain later, it only gives you the right 
to exclude others from using confusingly similar marks in the same 
area of goods and services, or one that is related. “Delta” for airlines 
does not infringe “Delta” for faucets. 
The fact that trademarks do not provide absolute ownership of a 
word or symbol is a central feature of trademark law, not a mistake 
or omission.41 As courts and academics have frequently pointed out, 
 
40 “Trademark law serves the important functions of protecting product identification, 
providing consumer information, and encouraging the production of quality goods and 
services. But protections ‘against unfair competition’ cannot be transformed into ‘rights to 
control language.’” Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting CPC 
Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)). 
41 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] trademark, 
unlike a copyright or patent, is not a ‘right in gross’ that enables a holder to enjoin all 
reproductions.” (quoting Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 35 (1st Cir. 
1989)); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Major Mud & Chem. Co., 221 U.S.P.Q. 1191 (T.T.A.B. 
1984), aff’d, 765 F.2d 161 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[R]ecognizing a right in gross…is contrary 
to principles of trademark law.”); see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:11 (5th ed. 2020) (“If there is no likelihood 
of confusion (and in the absence of dilution), the same marks can peacefully co-exist on 
different goods and services. In the author’s opinion, some well-known examples of co-
existence include: UNITED airlines and UNITED van lines, EAGLE shirts, EAGLE 
pencils, EAGLE pretzels, EAGLE brand condensed milk, CHAMPION spark plugs and 
CHAMPION sportswear, DELTA airlines, DELTA dental insurance and DELTA faucets, 
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the primary goal of trademark law is informational efficiency—ef-
ficient communication between consumers and producers.42 On the 
consumer side, I can decide what soap or detergent I like and, there-
after, can continue to purchase that brand knowing what I will get. 
If anyone could call their soap “Ivory” or their detergent “Palmol-
ive,” would I have to scrutinize the label each time to make sure the 
ingredients were the same? From an economic point of view, that 
would be very inefficient. In other words, the economic rationale for 
the “Ivory” trademark is not that Ivory has labored hard to build it 
up and advertise it.43 Nor is it that, without trademark protection, 
other soap companies could use the same name and “reap where they 
had not sown.”44 Instead, the law focuses on the benefits to the con-
sumer of stable nomenclature and thus the social gains produced by 
efficient information flow in the market. From the point of view of 
the producer, the existence of trademark protection gives an 
 
ACE retail hardware stores and ACE bandages, TROPICANA Las Vegas hotel and 
TROPICANA orange juice, The DOW stock market index and DOW chemical company, 
DELL computers and DELL magazines.”). 
42 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“[T]rademark 
law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the 
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ for it quickly and easily 
assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same 
producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At 
the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will 
reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product. The law 
‘encourage[s] the production of quality products,’ and simultaneously discourages those 
who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer’s inability quickly to 
evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale.” (citations omitted)); Virgin v. Nawab, 335 
F.3d 141, 147 (2d. Cir 2005) (“The paramount objective of the trademark law is to avoid 
confusion in the marketplace. The purpose for which the trademark law accords merchants 
the exclusive right to the use of a name or symbol in their area or commerce is 
identification, so that the merchants can establish goodwill for their goods based on past 
satisfactory performance, and the consuming public can rely on a mark as a guarantee that 
the goods or services so marked come from the merchant who has been found to be 
satisfactory in the past.” (citations omitted)); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987). 
43 See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968) (“A large expenditure of 
money does not in itself create legally protectable rights…By taking his ‘free ride,’ the 
copyist, albeit unintentionally, serves an important public interest by offering comparable 
goods at lower prices.”). 
44 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“[C]opying 
is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive 
economy. Allowing competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many instances.”). 
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incentive to invest in building up a stable brand identity, whether it 
is “cheap but acceptable,” “edgy fashion for skaters and stoners,” 
“the acme of luxury,” or anything in between. The trademark func-
tions, then, as a semantic handshake between producer and con-
sumer. 
This explanation leads naturally to the limits of the trademark. 
“Ivory” for soap would be infringed by “Ivorie” Soap. But it is not 
infringed by “Ivory Coast” for women’s fashion, or “Ivory” for 
barbeque sauce, information technology, wealth management, or 
any of the scores of other registered marks that use the word “Ivory” 
for different goods and services. “Ivory” is a useful term—it can 
connote beauty or style, a particular coast, a color, academia (“Ivory 
Tower”), a level of luxury (to those who can ignore how the ivory 
is procured), a contrast (“Ebony and Ivory”), and many other things. 
Trademark law seeks to simplify the informational choices of the 
consumer, but it also seeks to protect the public domain of valuable 
semantic symbols for future trademark users, operating in different 
areas of goods and services.45 To allow the first-comer to monopo-
lize all possible uses of a word or symbol could be as harmful to 
both producers and consumers as allowing infringing uses in the 
same area of goods or services. This is a point that bears reiterating: 
allowing absolutist claims—based on potential future uses without 
real basis in fact—would produce significant social costs. 
 
45 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 
(2004) (“The common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of 
consumers followed from the very fact that in cases like this one an originally descriptive 
term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the undesirability of allowing 
anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it 
first…[T]here being no indication that the [Lanham Act] was meant to deprive commercial 
speakers of the ordinary utility of descriptive words. ‘If any confusion results, that is a risk 
the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with a mark that uses a well-
known descriptive phrase.’”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 
213 (2000) (“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard 
to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law 
that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent 
distinctiveness.”); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 
1976) (“[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into 
promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public 
identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call 
an article by its name.”). 
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The point that there are multiple uses of a word or symbol ap-
plies directly to our study. What is true of the word “Ivory” is also 
true of the word “Duke.” Duke can refer to the university in North 
Carolina. But it could also refer to a particular title of nobility, the 
connotation of someone eminent in a field, a slang term for fists or 
for a fight, a cultivated hybrid of sweet and sour cherries, a cider 
apple (the Duke of Devonshire), the nickname of the actor John 
Wayne, or the surname “Duke” possessed by some individual with 
no connection to Duke’s founders. The list of Duke marks on the 
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46 This list is current as of February 17, 2021. 
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Notice that Duke University coexists with registered marks for 
“Duke’s” for mayonnaise and other condiments, “Duke” for kitchen 
equipment, “Duke Kahanamoku” for swim suits (referring to the 
legendary Hawaiian surfer and Olympic gold medal winner), the 
“The Duke of New York” for entertainment services, “Duke En-
ergy” for the power company, “Put Up Your Dukes” for sports 
gloves and mitts, and many, many more.47 In fact, as the display on 
the previous page shows, there are 193 registered marks that include 
the word “Duke” that have nothing to do with Duke University. This 
is not a matter of trademark law failing. It is a result of trademark 
law working. 
With some exceptions, infringement turns on a multi-part anal-
ysis of whether there is likelihood of confusion given a range of fac-
tors including the similarity of the marks, the strength of the senior 
mark, the proximity of the goods and services, and so on.48 There 
are also special protections for “famous” marks—a term of art we 
will explain later. However, to reiterate, Duke University does not 
own the word “Duke.” Still less does it own the letter “D.” It does 
not own the word “Devil.” Duke also does not own the word “Blue,” 
even though Duke’s sports teams are called the Blue Devils. Yet 
Duke often acts as if it had an absolute property right in each of these 
words and symbols, routinely filing oppositions when any of them 
appear in a trademark application. Our study shows, sadly, that those 
oppositions are mostly incorrect as a matter of law. 
 
47 See DUKE’S, Registration No. 4,005,468 (“Duke’s” mayonnaise); DUKE, 
Registration No. 274,575 (“Duke” kitchen equipment); DUKE KAHANAMOKU, 
Registration No. 1,019,452 (“Duke Kahanamoku” swim suits); THE DUKE OF NEW 
YORK, Registration No. 5,389,258 (“The Duke of New York” entertainment); DUKE 
ENERGY, Registration No. 2,316,855; PUT UP YOUR DUKES, Registration No. 
5,467,313 (“Put Up Your Dukes” sports gloves). In many cases, there are multiple 
registrations for these marks. 
48 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (regarding registered marks infringed by uses that are “likely to 
cause confusion”); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (regarding unregistered marks infringed by uses 
that are “likely to cause confusion”); In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 
1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (listing exemplary factors for proving likelihood of confusion). 
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2. Methodology 
We hand-coded every opposition that Duke has filed from 2015-
2018. Appendix A describes our methodology. Our conclusions are 
simple. There are definitely cases in which Duke was justified in 
opposing other marks. Reasonable people can also differ about the 
extent of trademark protection. However, even though we assume 
that every action here was taken in good faith, and even considering 
Duke’s claims sympathetically, we found that the majority of 
Duke’s oppositions over multiple years go far beyond the bounda-
ries of existing law. 
From 2015-2018, Duke filed 133 oppositions and three cancel-
lations—a challenge to a mark already issued.49 For convenience 
sake, we will generally refer to them all as oppositions. It also filed 
hundreds of requests for extensions of time to file oppositions, some 
of which were later converted into actual oppositions. These are 
more significant than they might appear, because the mere indica-
tion that there might be an opposition may be enough to persuade 
those attempting to register to abandon their application. Thus, it is 
possible that we are undercounting the effects of Duke’s trademark 
assertion practice. We focused only on the actual oppositions and 
cancellations, however, and coded them on the following four-point 
scale: 
 
49 Some context might be useful here. Professor Barton Beebe was kind enough to share 
with us his curated data set of trademarks. His figures show i.) that oppositions are very 
rare and ii.) that they dramatically affect the rate of abandonment of applications. Focusing 
on the five-year period from 2011 through 2015 he found that, “of the 516,679 use-based 
applications that were published during this period, 506,765 met with no opposition. Of 
these, 10,721 (or 2.1%) failed to register. In other words, a very small proportion of 
published applications that are not opposed are then abandoned. Of the 9,914 use-based 
applications that were opposed, only 38.4% managed to register.” E-mail from Barton 
Beebe, Professor of Law, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, to James Boyle, Professor of Law, Duke 
Law Sch. (on file with author). This data is not exactly comparable to ours – the period of 
time is slightly different, and we have not yet broken out use-based applications from 
intent-to-use applications, in which one would expect a higher rate of abandonment. 
Nevertheless, the disparity in rate of abandonment (from 2.1% of those that were not 
opposed to 61.6% of those that were) suggests that oppositions will produce a marked 
increase in abandonment rates. On the other hand, the rate of abandonment after Duke’s 
oppositions was still lower than the general group of marks that were opposed. Duke’s 
oppositions produced an abandonment rate of 49% rather than 61.6% in the general 
population. It could be that this reflects the low quality of Duke’s oppositions, but the data 
cannot demonstrate this one way or the other. 
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1) Clearly Erroneous: completely ungrounded as a matter of ex-
isting law. 
2) Far-fetched: unlikely to prevail. 
3) Arguable: existing trademark doctrine presents reasons why 
the application might, or might not, succeed, but Duke has some 
good arguments. 
4) Sound: the opposition was well-grounded in existing trade-
mark law and Duke would prevail were the matter to be litigated. 
3. Results 
After conducting an individual legal analysis of each of Duke’s 
oppositions or cancellations, the overall coding for 2015-2018 was 
as follows. 
1) Clearly Erroneous: 75 (55%) 
2) Far-fetched: 41 (30%) 
3) Arguable: 14 (10%) 
4) Sound; 6 (5%) 
 
Legal Merit Ratings 
2015–2018: 136 Oppositions 
 
"1" Clearly Erroneous, 75, 55%
"2" Far-fetched, 41, 30%
"3" Arguable, 14, 10%
"4" Sound, 6, 5%
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Thus, 85% of Duke’s oppositions were coded either clearly er-
roneous or far-fetched. Interestingly, had Duke only filed those 
twenty “sound” or “arguable” oppositions, they would have been 
closer to, though still above, the mean number of oppositions filed 
during that period by universities with the top ten athletic programs 
financially (6.8). To put it another way, the Comparative Study 
shows that Duke is a remarkable outlier in filing oppositions and the 
Merit Study suggests that the reason for that outlier status is simple: 
Duke is filing many oppositions with little or no legal merit. Simi-
larly situated universities—both in terms of academic status and ath-
letic revenues—do not tend to file those clearly erroneous or far-
fetched oppositions.50 This is consistent with a “wisdom of well-
lawyered crowds” hypothesis, that economically rational parties 
who have the resources to obtain high quality legal advice will tend 
to converge on a relatively accurate assessment of the law, or at least 
an accurate prediction of the actions of authoritative decision mak-
ers. We will return later to the question of why Duke is so different 
from its peer group. 
Our study did show some annual variation in both the number 
and the validity of Duke’s oppositions during the period of the study. 
The number of annual oppositions ranged from twenty-three to 
forty-six. The “clearly erroneous” rating ranged from 74% in 2015 
to 36% in 2018. The “sound” rating ranged from 8% in 2016 to 0% 
in 2018. 
What explains this variation in rating? It is of course possible, 
despite our attempts to standardize and double-check the analysis, 
that unobserved factors caused variations in the standard for what 
 
50 As we mentioned at the beginning of this Article, we are concerned that this may be 
changing. The University of Texas also pushes the boundaries of trademark law in 
oppositions—for example, because it has a registration of a hand making a “longhorn” 
symbol for decals and shirts, it appears to think it owns the design of a hand with the second 
and pinky finger raised in other contexts and for unrelated goods and services. The sign, of 
course, has many other meanings and variations, including “I love you” in American Sign 
Language, a gesture of approbation at a heavy metal concert, a warning sign against 
demonic influences (one that is actually mentioned by Bram Stoker in Dracula), or an 
indication that the person gestured towards is a cuckold. See Dio’s Two-finger Gesture - 
What Does It Mean?, BBC NEWS MAG. (May 18, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8687002.stm [https://perma.cc/YL8A-
KX9P]. At present, however, Duke is still in a different league. 
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counted as clearly erroneous, sound and so on, variations that our 
subsequent review failed to pick up. However, if Duke adopted a 
relatively algorithmic approach to oppositions—opposing the ma-
jority of marks with “Duke,” “Blue,” “Devil,” and the letter “D” re-
gardless of context or area of trade—then two things might happen. 
First, one would expect some annual variation in the number of peo-
ple seeking marks featuring such words. Second, one would expect 
that Duke’s standard oppositions would vary in perceived merit de-
pending on the area of goods or services in which the putatively of-
fending mark was sought. If random happenstance yielded the filing 
of a “Duke” mark for industrial railway couplings and boat-hooks 
one year51 and a “Duke” mark for hospital blankets52 the next year, 
then Duke would automatically object to both, but the coding 
would—rightly—assess those oppositions differently. Alterna-
tively, temporal fluctuations might be precipitated by an external 
event such as a national championship in a revenue sport. This might 
encourage (illicit) freeloaders deliberately to attempt to infringe, or 
tiptoe close to, Duke’s marks, joining the innocent throngs with their 
“Bluefood,” “Blue Ball Chillers,” or “Devil’s Garden” alcohol who 
are surprised to find Duke believes it has a right to naysay them. 
While the latter oppositions would still be ungrounded, and would 
be coded as such, the former would improve Duke’s coded percent-
ages of accuracy. Finally, Duke’s trademark portfolio might change, 
as it did in 2017 when Duke gained registered marks over a number 
of goods on which logos might be displayed.53 It is worth noting 
that, even taking the most “generous” annual rating in 2018, 73% of 
Duke’s oppositions were still rated as either clearly erroneous or far-
fetched. 





51 See, e.g., DUKE, Opp’n. No. 91,230,622 (filed Oct. 12, 2016). 
52 See, e.g., DUKE, Cancellation No. 92,064,529 (filed Sept. 27, 2016). In this case, 
Duke filed a cancellation rather than an opposition. 
53 DUKE, Registration No. 5,335,576; see also DUKE, Registration No. 5,472,647; 
DUKE, Registration No. 5,568,287. 
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Legal Merit Ratings 
 
 
The statistics alone may not convey adequately the extent of 
Duke’s oppositions or the tenuousness of some of their legal justifi-
cations. Below we give some examples. 
4. Representative Examples of Over-Assertion 
“Duke” marks. When Duke concludes that the applicant’s mark 
comes too close to the word “Duke,” it brings not only a section 2(d) 
"1" Clearly Erroneous, 17, 74%
"2" Far-fetched, 4, 18%
"3" Arguable, 1, 4%
"4" Sound, 1, 4%
2015: 23 oppositions
"1" Clearly Erroneous, 20, 54%
"2" Far-fetched, 11, 30%
"3" Arguable, 3, 8%
"4" Sound, 3, 8%
2016: 37 oppositions
"1" Clearly Erroneous, 27, 59%
"2" Far-fetched, 15, 33%
"3" Arguable, 2, 4%
"4" Sound, 2, 4%
2017: 46 oppositions
"1" Clearly Erroneous, 11, 36%
"2" Far-fetched, 11, 37%
"3" Arguable, 8, 27%
"4" Sound, 0, 0%
2018: 30 oppositions
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likelihood of confusion claim,54 but also a section 43(c) dilution 
claim55 and a section 2(a) claim that the mark falsely suggests a 
connection to Duke University.56 Duke brought these claims in 
opposing the following marks: 
“The Dude Diet” for a diet-related website 
“Kuke” for electronic products 
“Goluke” for clothing 
“Le Duc” for food and drink services57 
Duke does have well-known “Duke” trademarks for educational 
services, medical services, athletic merchandise, and so on. Yet the 
marks above are sufficiently different from those “Duke” marks to 
make the assertion of consumer confusion frivolous.58 In addition, 
as discussed below, Duke’s dilution claims are likely to fail because 
its “Duke” marks seem very unlikely to meet the threshold “fame” 
requirement. The section 2(a) claims are even more far-fetched. In 
order to succeed, Duke must show that consumers encountering the 
applicant’s mark would conclude that it “points uniquely and 
 
54 That is, that the new mark “[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a 
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously 
used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or 
in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). 
55 That is, that Duke is such a nationally famous mark that it is entitled to the special 
protections reserved for such marks against dilution and blurring by section 43(c) of the 
Lanham Act. We discuss this claim later. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
56 Duke may also include other grounds for opposition that are unrelated to conflicts 
with Duke’s trademarks—failure to show use, lack of distinctiveness, fraud on the PTO, 
etc.—but we have not listed those here because our focus is on the breadth of Duke’s 
asserted exclusivity. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
57  THE DUDE DIET, Opp’n No. 91,225,625 (filed Jan. 4, 2016); KUKE, Opp’n No, 
91,229,916 (filed Sept. 1, 2016); GOLUKE, Opp’n No. 91,236,293 (filed Aug. 16, 2017); 
LE DUC, Opp’n No. 91,226,416 (filed Jan. 27, 2016). 
58 Duke also opposed “Duke’s Butt” for “[a]dult sexual stimulation aids, namely, 
artificial penises, artificial vaginas.” DUKE’S BUTT, Opp’n No. 91,217,109 (filed June 
11, 2014). While all of us would wish to unknow the fact that there is a market for the 
artificial derrieres of imaginary aristocrats, Duke has no credible legal basis to oppose this 
mark. The opposition may actually bring more attention to this otherwise hopefully 
forgettable incident. See Streisand Effect, Wikipedia, 
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streisand_effect [https://perma.cc/X3W9-TVNJ]. 
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unmistakably” to Duke University.59 Even when the contested mark 
is exactly the same as the name of a university, this requirement has 
not been met. When the University of Notre Dame opposed a cheese 
importer’s registration of “Notre Dame” for cheese on section 2(a) 
grounds, the Federal Circuit rejected this claim because the cheese 
mark did not “point uniquely to the University.”60 And that is where 
the names are identical. Any referential link between the marks 
listed above and Duke University is more remote. 
“Devil” marks. When opposing marks that use either the word 
“Devil” or an image of a devil, Duke cites section 2(d) likelihood of 
confusion grounds, and sometimes adds the section 2(a) “falsely 
suggesting a connection” claim discussed above. These oppositions 
are premised in part on Duke’s “Blue Devils” mark and its marks 
including images of devils, but neither offers a legally tenable basis 
for blocking other marks merely because they include the word 
“devil,” particularly when they are used for products unrelated to 





 “Werdo” with the above image of a devil for shirts and hats 
“Devils Nightmare” for beer 
“Devil’s Garden” for alcoholic beverages 
“Pretty Devil” for slot machines61 
 
59 Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Velocity, LLC, 117 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492, 1495 (T.T.A.B. 2015). 
To prevail on a section 2(a) claim, “Duke” must also be “of sufficient fame or reputation 
that…a connection with the Opposer would be presumed,” but the “fame” standard is less 
stringent than “fame” for purposes of dilution. 
60 Univ. of Notre Dame v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 1372, 1377 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (noting that the court’s conclusion might have changed had Notre Dame been 
able to show that the cheese importer “intended to identify the university”). Duke would 
have been well-advised to bear this ruling in mind in the “Duke’s Butt” opposition 
described earlier, a mark which, unlike the cheese, was not exactly the same as the 
university’s name. 
61 WERDO, Opp’n No. 91,241,792 (filed June 13, 2018); DEVILS NIGHTMARE, 
Opp’n No. 91,227,202 (filed Apr. 4, 2016); DEVIL’S GARDEN, Opp’n No. 91,234,089 
(filed Apr. 19, 2017); PRETTY DEVIL, Opp’n No. 91,222,305 (filed June 10, 2015). 
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“D” and “Blue.” For marks including the letter “D” or the word 
“blue,” Duke continues to allege section 2(d) likelihood of confu-
sion, apparently believing that its trademark rights allow it to block 
others from using something as elementary as a letter or a color. It 
does so even when the “D” in question in no way resembles Duke’s 
“D” marks and the products in question are unrelated. Its opposi-
tions to marks using the word “blue” are perhaps the most tenuous—
while Duke owns a composite “blue devils” mark, it cannot claim 
the word “blue.” Yet it opposed: 
“Beach’d” for beach bags and cosmetic bags 
“D’Grill” for barbecue smokers and grills 
“DLove” for advertising and other services 
“True Blue” for auto parts 
“Stay Blue” for denim clothing 
“Blue Ball Chiller” for alcoholic beverages 
“Blue Solutions” for various goods and services related to car 
rentals and car sharing.62 
The examples above all received a “clearly erroneous” ranking 
on our four-point scale. 
In short, Duke is a trademark bully. Yet, it is an interesting bully. 
Its pattern of aggressive behavior turns out to reveal some fascinat-
ing phenomena, both in the changing role of a university and in cer-
tain features of trademark law. Those features are misunderstood 
and overstated, but they provide the superficial justifications for 
trademark bullying. 
What results did these 136 oppositions bring about? 
 
 
62 BEACH’D, Opp’n No. 91,234,084 (filed Apr. 19, 2017); D’GRILL, Opp’n No. 
91,234,213 (filed Apr. 26, 2017); DLOVE, Opp’n No. 91,240,747 (filed Apr. 18, 2018); 
TRUE BLUE, Opp’n No. 91,223,933 (filed Sept. 21, 2015); STAY BLUE, Opp’n No. 
91,232,929 (filed Feb. 15, 2017); BLUE BALL CHILLER, Opp’n No. 91,220,755 (filed 
Feb. 23, 2015); BLUE SOLUTIONS, Opp’n No. 91,235,056 (filed June 12, 2017). 
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5. Outcomes 63 
Disposition of Opposition Proceedings 
2015–2018: 136 Oppositions 
Duke’s oppositions had an effect. Sixty-seven of the marks were 
abandoned—a substantially higher percentage of abandonment than 
for marks that are not opposed.64 Of those abandonments, forty-
eight were default judgments—largely because the applicants did 
not respond after the opposition was filed. Eighteen were explicit 
withdrawals and one was an abandonment in exchange for Duke 
 
63 The outcomes in this chart are current as of December 1, 2019.  
64 These marks may have been abandoned for a variety of reasons. In some cases, the 
applicant cannot afford the prohibitive expense of defending an opposition. See B. AUSTIN 
GADDIS ET AL., DISCOURAGING FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS IN TRADEMARK OPPOSITION 
PROCEEDINGS: A POLICY PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE 3 (Samuel-Glushko Tech. Law & Policy Clinic, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. ed., 2015), 
available at https://tlpc.colorado.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/TMOppositionReform_WhitePaper3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S5CM-35UZ] (“[S]maller companies simply cannot bear the financial 
burden of defending an opposition.”). With applications filed on an “intent to use” basis, 
the marks may have been abandoned because the applicant never began using the mark in 
commerce. 
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allowing registration of a different mark.65 Other than applications 
in which Duke prevailed because of a failure to respond, or an ex-
plicit withdrawal, in two cases the TTAB entered a judgment on the 
merits in favor of Duke.66 The few victories should neither count 
against nor in favor of Duke—the TTAB explicitly encourages set-
tlement in preference to issuing decisions.67 In a total of fifty-nine 
cases, Duke withdrew its opposition either with or without some 
modification of the mark or agreement between the parties. Of those 
fifty-nine withdrawals, fifty-one marks were registered despite 
Duke’s opposition. Eleven were registered without qualifying lan-
guage and thirty-one were registered with an “agreement reached 
for the avoidance of confusion” or “assurance.”68 Nine were regis-
tered with some modification or exchange.69 In eight cases, Duke 
withdrew its opposition, but the mark was not registered for a variety 
of reasons.70 Finally, eight cases are still pending. 
 
65 “Default judgments” result from inaction: the application is abandoned because the 
applicant does not respond to official communications, and judgment is therefore entered 
against them. By comparison, “withdrawals” result when the applicant affirmatively files 
a document withdrawing their application. The TTAB categorizes both as “abandoned.” 
Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.65, 2.68 (2021). Neither results from 
an actual decision by the TTAB on the merits of Duke’s claims. 
66 In the two cases where a decision was issued in Duke’s favor, only Duke filed a brief 
or motion, and the applicants did not formally contest Duke’s arguments. As a result, one 
claim was “granted as conceded” and the other was sustained in part due to admissions by 
the applicant. 
67 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 605.01 (June 2020) (“The Board encourages settlement, and 
several aspects of Board practice and procedure…serve to facilitate the resolution of cases 
by agreement.”). 
68 The TTAB documents note, in generic language, that some agreement had been 
reached between the parties for avoidance of confusion. See, e.g., Opp’n No. 91,242,555, 
Consented Withdrawal of Opposition (filed Nov. 25, 2019). This language could refer to 
significant restrictions on the applicant’s use of the new mark or merely more modest or 
face-saving acquiescence. In these cases, the record did not contain a formal modification 
of the mark or the goods and services to which it applied. 
69 Sometimes the proceedings involve multiple marks with different dispositions. If the 
application for one of the marks was still pending, we classified the opposition as 
“pending.” If one of the marks was registered, we classified the full opposition as 
“registered.” 
70 Three of those marks were abandoned for an unrelated reason, namely because the 
applicant did not begin using the mark in commerce. The remaining five applications are 
still pending for reasons other than the opposition proceeding. As a reminder, these 
outcomes are current as of December 1, 2019. 
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Do these numbers argue that Duke’s views of trademark law are 
sound? After all, of the 136 marks it objected to, sixty-seven simply 
went away, nine were amended, and Duke won in two cases. In 
thirty-one cases, the TTAB record states as boilerplate that the op-
position was withdrawn “in view of the agreement reached between 
the parties for the avoidance of confusion”71 though the record does 
not indicate what, if anything, that agreement stipulated. That means 
that in 109 cases, or 80% of the total, Duke received a result that 
could be described as favorable. One can imagine an institution say-
ing, “This is effective! Let us keep doing it.” Sadly, we think the 
results suggest that bullying works, particularly against parties that 
do not have Duke’s resources. It does not suggest that bullying is 
correct. Further, as we will discuss later in the Article, it is not clear 
that these “victories” are worth the cost, either ethical or financial.72 
 To be frank, from the evidence we have been able to assess, 
Duke gets little out of its oppositions other than a reputation as a 
bully. When oppositions are unfounded because the marks do not 
create a likelihood of confusion, then Duke gains little by persuad-
ing those non-confusing marks to abandon or modify their marks. 
Why, then, does it continue to engage in the practice? There are two 
possible meanings to the question “Why is Duke doing this?” The 
first could be restated as, “Why is Duke, otherwise a sober and law-
abiding entity, making legal claims that seem ungrounded and doing 
so at such an anomalous rate vis a vis its peers?” The second could 
be restated as “Forget the legal issues. What does Duke think it gets 
out of this pattern of behavior?” These oppositions cost expensive 
legal fees and institutional effort. Does Duke really think it stood to 
be harmed by “True Blue” for auto parts, “Bluefood” for food, 
“D’Grill” for barbecue smokers and grills, or “Devil’s Garden” for 
alcoholic beverages? Or that it would benefit if it stopped these 
marks from issuing? True, Duke’s director of trademark licensing 
said, “[w]e find it’s much easier to proactively prevent confusion 
 
71 See, e.g., Opp’n No. 91,245,555, Consented Withdrawal of Opposition at 1 (filed Nov. 
25, 2019). 
72 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
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than to cure it after it happens.”73 But would any normal person look 
at those marks and say, “They must come from Duke University!”? 
Is there any possible financial upside, or avoidance of financial 
downside, to engaging in a trademark theater of the absurd? 
We believe the answers to those questions are linked. To under-
stand how we got here, we have to focus both on what the university 
thinks it is doing, and how it believes trademark law helps it—and 
permits it—to achieve those goals. In the sections that follow, this 
Article tries to do exactly that. We focus on three transformations, 
one to the self-conception of the university, and two to trademark 
law. These transformations do not justify trademark bullying. 
Duke’s anomalous status as revealed by both empirical studies give 
ample evidence of that fact. In fact, we will argue that Duke’s ac-
tions are technically irrational—the financial losses outweigh the 
gains and are likely to continue to do so—even if one ignored the 
ethical aspect of bullying. Yet those transformations do help to ex-
plain a mindset, an attitude towards business and the law, that leads 
to bullying. This point has been echoed by other scholars who have 
applied behavioral economic ideas to trademark bullying,74 but we 
attempt to extend the analysis. That mindset, that legal and commer-
cial consciousness, has implications far beyond Duke’s particular 
actions. It bears on the more general phenomenon of university 
overreach described in the introduction—both in diagnosis and in 
potential cure. Among other things, policy proposals premised on 
rational behavior are unlikely to work well in situations of system-
atic but patterned irrationality. Later, we assess the possible expla-
nations for Duke’s behavior in the light of this analysis and conclude 
with some policy recommendations, both for universities and for 
trademark law. 
 
73 Collin Binkley, Small Businesses Bear the Brunt when Big Colleges Fiercely Protect 
Their Brand, CLAIMS J. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/ 
national/2018/08/30/286497.htm [https://perma.cc/8HXZ-CXXA]. 
74 See generally Kiser, supra note 24. 
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II. THREE TRANSFORMATIONS 
A. The University as Mega-Brand 
The first thing to note is the expansion of universities into the 
role of mega-brands. Here, this is the reimagination of the role of a 
university to be an entity that, in Duke’s own words, produces “a 
wide range of products sold and licensed by Duke University, in vir-
tually all areas of endeavor, to men, women and children of all 
ages.”75 You might think that Duke University would have a series 
of trademarks protecting its educational enterprises, its hospital’s 
medical services, its sports teams, and so on. But trademark law also 
protects the misleadingly-titled, unregistered federal “common 
law”76 marks based merely on use. If we were to go into business 
providing goods and services, even without registering a federal 
mark, federal trademark law gives us some rights to protect our ex-
isting activities, though not to reserve that name for future expan-
sion.77 The key here is actual use. One may not claim “dibs” on a 
word for a particular use and thereby remove it from the public do-
main, preventing others from using it. Yet the list of products in 
which Duke claims a common law trademark is seemingly endless. 
Here is a small portion of the activities in which Duke claims to have 
a common law mark: 
Cosmetics, skin care products, personal bathing and 
grooming products, and toiletries (including, by way 
of example, body and nail art, decorative transfers, 
face paint, glitter, personal care packs comprising 
containers with toiletries therein, and toothbrushes); 
. . . belts and suspenders; bibs; bottoms undergar-
ments and other lingerie; Fabric for sewing; . . . Per-
sonal accessories (including, by way of example, hair 
holders and hair ornaments, key holders, sunglasses, 
 
75 See, e.g., Opp’n No. 91,242,557 at 11–12 (filed July 23, 2018). This language is 
standard in Duke’s filings and appears in dozens of its opposition notices. 
76 There is, of course, no general federal common law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Even if there were, this is a poor name for marks protected as a 
matter of federal law because of use, particularly since those marks are provided for 
explicitly in the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
77 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
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and wallets); Jewelry for men and women (including 
both costume jewelry and jewelry of precious metal); 
Time-keeping instruments (including clocks and 
watches);…Electronic and computer accessories  
(including, by way of example, data storage devices, 
earphones, mouse pads, protective storage for  
computers and computer accessories, speakers); 
Housewares and household furnishings (including by 
way of example candles, cushions, curtains, mats, 
picture frames, rugs, and trash cans); bedding and 
pillows; bathware (the latter including, by way of  
example, towels, washcloths, bath mats, shower  
curtains, toiletry holders, and bathing accesso-
ries);…Furniture (including by way of example 
chairs, canopies, stools, and tables); Lighting and ac-
cessories therefor (including by way of example 
night lights, lamps, lampshades, and flashlights); 
Games and toys (including, by way of example, ac-
tion figures, dolls, stuffed and plush toys, board 
games, card games, electronic and video games, tab-
letop games, outdoor games and equipment for such 
games); game tables…78 
To be clear, this is a short excerpt to spare the reader’s patience. 
There is much more. In fact, there are pages more.79 This is some-
thing different in both quantity and quality. Duke is effectively turn-
ing trademark law upside down. As we observed in scores of oppo-
sitions over multiple years, when someone applies for a mark in an 
area apparently completely unrelated to Duke University—commer-
cial rigging, for example—Duke will then claim that it is already 
offering goods or services in that area, often on the basis of scanty 
 
78 This is boilerplate language in Duke’s oppositions. See, e.g., Opp’n No. 91,241,466 
at 77 (filed May 30, 2018) (+1D STAT KNOWLEDGE IQ design and other +1D designs 
for fantasy sports). 
79 Duke has since moved on to gain registered trademarks over some of the more 
plausible of these categories for branded merchandise, for example: computer cases, lamps, 
refrigerators, jewelry, luggage, and balls for sport. Our rating of Duke’s oppositions from 
the effective date of these registrations is correspondingly more generous for those 
categories. 
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evidence, apparently retrofitted to whatever mark Duke wishes to 
oppose. 
Duke then lists, as in the quoted paragraph above, claims to com-
mon law marks over a staggering array of “products sold and li-
censed by Duke University, in virtually all areas of endeavor, to 
men, women and children of all ages.”80 Thus, no matter what the 
product is, Duke claims that its common law marks are being in-
fringed. The reasoning is effectively, “since a Duke logo could be 
slapped on anything, Duke owns a trademark in everything!” It is as 
if Delta Airlines claimed that Delta faucets were infringing its mark 
because planes have bathrooms with sinks in them. 
This leads us to the other lessons that Duke’s behavior offers us: 
it highlights a series of areas in which trademark law has strayed 
from its core function. In each of these areas, the law actually stops 
far short of creating an absolute property right over a word or sym-
bol. Indeed, the courts have been explicitly hostile to such a move. 
Yet brand owners use the existence of these departures as the basis 
for their most aggressive—and often unsupportable—actions. We 
pointed out that some universities have come to see themselves as 
mega-brands. To some extent, part of this is trademark law’s fault. 
The exceptions do not in fact destroy the rule, but an isolated insti-
tutional licensing culture can act as if they did, taking the anomalies 
and placing them center stage, while downplaying trademark’s core 
rationale and its central limiting doctrines. We will call this ten-
dency “trademark maximalism.” 
Trademark maximalism stitches together the doctrines we are 
about to outline into an imaginative, but misleading, narrative. Ex-
ceptions allow brand bullies to deny the existence of the rule. Both 
the platypus—which lays eggs—and the blue whale are mammals. 
Yet, a zoologist who postulated that mammals either lay eggs or are 
100-foot-long sea creatures would be off the mark. Trademark’s 
anomalies are a similarly poor basis for general guidance. 
 
80 See, e.g., Opp’n No. 91,242,557 at 11–12 (filed July 23, 2018). 
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B. The Franchising Revolution 
The first of the expansions of trademark law is the franchising 
revolution. The goal of trademark is to act as a signal between pro-
ducers and consumers. Stable brand identity is supposed to simplify 
purchasing decisions by conveying information about product qual-
ity, ingredients, and source. Think how poorly this rationale fits af-
filiational goods—goods that are designed to signal an affiliation 
with a university or a sports team.81 When most people buy a T-shirt 
with Duke on it, they are not saying, “Wow, Duke makes such high-
quality T-shirts. This is the large white cotton T-shirt for me!” In-
stead, they are signaling an affiliation. The trademark “Duke” is not 
being used in the way “Ivory” was for soap—telling me something 
about ingredients and product quality and source. Instead, the trade-
mark “Duke” is the product. The generic cotton T-shirt that is the 
substrate for the logo is merely the delivery mechanism. 
Imagine that I am a Duke fan and that I would pay up to $15 to 
signal my allegiance. Let us say that the marginal cost of the shirt is 
$3. Without trademark, in an efficient market, the price of the shirt 
would fall asymptotically close to marginal cost, $3, and the surplus 
of $12 would go to the consumer, rather than to the producer. Is this 
a socially suboptimal result? That depends. If I think that the logo 
“Duke” symbolizes “this shirt was produced by Duke, and it gets the 
profits,” then I am being misled. Let us call that fan “Source Buyer.” 
I am not getting what I paid for, though the low price might have 
tipped me off. Still, that is a legitimate trademark complaint. But if 
I simply want a piece of cloth that says “Duke” on it, at the lowest 
practicable cost, then I am not. Call that fan “Affiliation Signaler.” 
For the signaler, if the law allows Duke to use its state-granted mo-
nopoly over the word Duke to raise the price above marginal cost 
for reasons unrelated to trademark law’s normal signaling function, 
then it would be overreaching. Duke fans, presumably, include both 
Source Buyers and Affiliation Signalers.82 
 
81 See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687, 1708 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest 
in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1725–28 (1999). 
82 Empirical studies have shown a diversity of attitudes toward the assumption that most 
purchasers will always assume sponsorship by the trademark owner, undercutting 
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In practice, the law of trademark has sometimes, but not always, 
chosen to minimize this complexity and to transfer the consumer 
surplus to the producer. Partly this seems to rest on an idea that in-
tellectual property owners should have an entitlement to all positive 
externalities generated by their rights, for economic reasons. With-
out the ability to capture every cent of consumer surplus generated 
by its symbols, goes the argument, Duke would be under-incentiv-
ized to produce excellence—whether in sports teams or education. 
Partly it rests on the idea that it is simply wrong “to reap where one 
has not sown,” regardless of the economic consequences. Finally, it 
rests partly on the empirically dubious idea that most or all purchas-
ers are “Source Buyers.” These arguments are, at best, questionable 
and sometimes circular.83 Regardless, only Duke may make shirts 
 
conclusions from older decisions. However, in Duke’s favor, assumptions of sponsorship 
and attitudes towards material confusion (confusion that affects the purchasing decision) 
appear to be more likely in sports merchandise. See Matthew Kugler, The Materiality of 
Sponsorship Confusion, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1911, 1915 (2017) (“The results show that, 
across a wide range of products and domains, sponsorship confusion is rarely material to 
more than half of potential consumers. And, if only material confusion is counted, a number 
of products that would need to be licensed under current law would instead be unrestricted. 
Adopting a materiality requirement would therefore change the law of trademark 
merchandising to a meaningful degree. The requirement would not, however, complete a 
revolution in trademark sponsorship law. Sponsorship is material often enough that a great 
many products would still need to be licensed. Most sports merchandise licensing, for 
example, would remain secure even after discounting for materiality.”). 
83 The argument that positive externalities must be fully internalized in order to generate 
efficient outcomes is rarely debated at length. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, 
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 276–79 (2007). Nor is the assumption that one may 
not reap where one has not sown. When we do scrutinize those propositions, we are forced 
to confront the fact that capitalism and the marketplace of ideas centrally depend on very 
different assumptions. Every producer who learns from his competitor’s efforts—who is 
given valuable information by his competitor’s choices of where to choose a store location 
or how to design a product, every thinker who stands on the shoulders of giants—without 
paying giant royalties, is benefitting from another without compensation. This process of 
uncompensated taking of valuable information produced by others is actually part of our 
definition of competition and free speech. Only in very limited circumstances do we give 
the original innovator some form of right—a patent, copyright, trademark or trade secret—
which allows it to capture those positive externalities. In that sense, Brandeis appears 
correctly to describe the premises of U.S. law in INS v. AP when he said, albeit in dissent, 
“The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths 
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, 
free as the air to common use.” Int’l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 
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which bear Duke’s logo and name. Acclimated to a world where 
marks are the product rather than a signal of the quality of the prod-
uct, many consumers may now find this normal. Duke did not start 
this revolution. But, like most major universities, sports teams, and 
mega-brands, it has been profoundly shaped by its results. 
The decisions which extended the law in this way—the ones we 
group under the label “the franchising revolution”—have been sub-
ject to robust academic criticism, most notably by Professors Stacy 
Dogan, Mark Lemley, and Jessica Litman.84 Pointing out the con-
siderable normative and empirical uncertainty around the extension 
of trademark law in this way, Dogan and Lemley argue: 
Given these complexities, together with the eco-
nomic interests at stake, one might expect that the 
law and practice of merchandising rights would be 
well-settled and reflect a considered balancing of the 
interests of trademark holders and their competitors. 
In reality, however, much of the multi-billion dollar 
industry of merchandise licensing has grown around 
a handful of cases from the 1970s and 1980s that es-
tablished merchandising rights with little regard for 
the competing legal or policy concerns at stake. 
Those cases are far from settled law – indeed, at least 
as many decisions decline to give trademark owners 
the right to control sales of their trademarks as prod-
ucts. We think it is high time to revisit that case law 
and to reconsider the theoretical justifications for a 
merchandising right. That review provides little sup-
port for trademark owners’ assumptions about mer-
chandising. Doctrinally, the most broad-reaching 
 
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Or, to quote Justice Holmes from the same case, 
“Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable—a matter 
of fact.” Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Though courts occasionally suggest, and brand 
owners devoutly believe, that if value is produced, a right to capture that value should be 
granted, this does not follow as a matter of either law or logic. See JAMES BOYLE, THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 138, 147–53 (2008). 
84 See generally Lemley, supra note 81; Litman, supra note 81; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark 
A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right, Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 
461 (2005). 
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merchandising cases – which presumed infringement 
based on the public recognition of the mark as a 
trademark – were simply wrong in their analysis of 
trademark infringement and have been specifically 
rejected by subsequent decisions. Philosophically, 
even a merchandising right that hinges on likelihood 
of confusion raises competition-related concerns that 
should affect courts’ analysis of both the merits and 
appropriate remedies in merchandising cases. Per-
haps most importantly, recent Supreme Court case 
law suggests that, if it had the opportunity to evaluate 
the merchandising theory (something it has never 
done), the Court would deny the existence of such a 
right. Further, the Court would be right to do so. 
When a trademark is sold, not as a source indicator, 
but as a desirable feature of a product, competition 
suffers – and consumers pay – if other sellers are shut 
out of the market for that feature.85 
They conclude that the legal basis for an unfettered merchandis-
ing or franchising right is at best, mixed, and that there are compel-
ling normative reasons running against it.86 Courts have often been 
equally hostile to the premises of the franchising right. In one case, 
for example, involving T-shirts bearing the (unauthorized) symbol 
and name of Duke’s neighbor, the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, the court first pointed out the considerable variation in 
the circuit court decisions on this issue, and then went on to confront 
the difference between source and affiliation buyers head-on: 
[T]he court is skeptical that those individuals who 
purchase unlicensed tee-shirts bearing [University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill] marks care one way 
or the other whether the University sponsors or en-
dorses such products or whether the products are of-
ficially licensed. Instead, as defendants contend, it is 
 
85 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 84, at 464–65. 
86 Id. 
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equally likely that individuals buy the shirts to show 
their support for the University.87 
To be fair, other courts have come to the opposite conclusion, 
particularly in the sports franchising context and that may now be 
the majority view. We have tried to make our assessment as sympa-
thetic to Duke’s position as possible. Accordingly, while we agree 
with those scholars and courts that have been skeptical about the 
merchandising right for universities, we assumed exactly the oppo-
site for the purposes of this study. If someone buys a shirt with 
“Duke University” or “Duke Blue Devils” on it, regardless of 
whether they care that the product was in fact produced or licensed 
by Duke, we assume in this Article that Duke is entitled to the profit. 
Correspondingly, in our coding we rated all of Duke’s actions op-
posing marks which would interfere with such markets as sound. For 
example, when Duke opposed “Cameron Krzyz” for apparel (the 
trademarked nickname for Duke basketball fans is “Cameron Cra-
zies”) we coded that as “sound,”88 one of only three that year which 
achieved that favorable rating. 
In this Article, we have assumed for argument’s sake that the 
merchandising revolution is a fait accompli. In other words, though 
we agree with scholarly skepticism about the precedent and policy 
of the franchising revolution, when assessing whether Duke is a 
trademark bully, we have assumed the opposite: that Duke is in fact 
entitled to the trademark and financial benefits resulting from that 
process. Our conclusion, in other words, is based on a generous in-
terpretation of Duke’s legal rights. We have three reasons for doing 
so. First, we want to be clear that our coding of Duke’s decisions is 
not a harsh one, which makes its conclusions all the more 
 
87 Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 
1989); see also Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (“We commonly identify ourselves by displaying emblems expressing 
allegiances. Our jewelry, clothing and cars are emblazoned with inscriptions showing the 
organizations we belong to, the schools we attend, the landmarks we have visited, the sports 
teams we support, the beverages we imbibe. Although these inscriptions frequently include 
names and emblems that are also used as collective marks or trademarks, it would be naive 
to conclude that the name or emblem is desired because consumers believe that the product 
somehow originated with or was sponsored by the organization the name or emblem 
signifies.”). 
88 CAMERON KRZYZ, Opp’n No. 91,229,209 (filed July 27, 2016). 
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remarkable. Second, we think that an entire industry has been built 
on a “generous” interpretation of the law. Perhaps those early deci-
sions were poorly reasoned. Perhaps their subsequent interpretation 
by business culture imposes unjustified costs on consumers, at least 
half of whom appear empirically not to be Source Buyers. Or per-
haps—at least in the university context—it creates an incentive for 
the university to stray far from its central mission in ways that might 
not be good for either the university or society. Still, despite those 
considerations, the industry exists and the courts would, rightly, be 
hesitant to disrupt it. Finally, the notion that Duke University should 
get the profits reaped from the use of its name has both an intuitive 
normative appeal and a self-fulfilling dimension. As Professor Lem-
ley explains: 
Ironically, having accepted the merchandising ra-
tionale for certain sorts of trademarks, we may find 
it hard to undo. It is possible that consumers have 
come to expect that ‘Dallas Cowboys’ caps are li-
censed by the Cowboys, not because they serve a 
trademark function, but simply because the law has 
recently required such a relationship. If this expecta-
tion exists, consumers may be confused if the law 
changes. But a limited, likelihood-of-confusion ra-
tionale for keeping a bad law intact is quite different 
from a theoretical justification for cementing and ex-
tending the merchandising right. There are lots of fa-
mous marks and icons for which we have not granted 
merchandising rights. No one controls the exclusive 
right to make ‘Statue of Liberty’ tee-shirts or paper-
weights, for example. Even if we decide not to undo 
what we have done in the sports cases, there is no 
reason to take it any further, since it is hard to find 
any theoretical or statutory basis for the property ap-
proach to trademarks.89 
 
89 Lemley, supra note 81, at 1708–09. Lemley’s conclusions about the overreach of 
modern trademark law have been widely, and approvingly, cited by courts. See, e.g., 
Radiance Foundation, Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 325 (4th Cir. 2015); CPC Int’l, Inc. 
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As Lemley points out, even if one accepts the dubious logic of 
the franchising revolution, there is no reason to go beyond it.90 For 
example, would you assume that a mockumentary about beauty con-
tests in Minnesota dairy country called “Dairy Queens” was spon-
sored by the ice cream chain of the same name? One—widely criti-
cized—court decision did.91 To paraphrase the leading treatise on 
trademark, there are decisions that step beyond the lines.92 We have 
accepted that—contrary to the court’s reasoning in the Board of 
Governors of the University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine93—
Duke is entitled to any revenues from merchandise that directly sig-
nals connection to Duke as a university or a sports team. We have, 
however, rejected the claim that since Duke has some rights based 
on sponsorship or affiliation, it therefore has rights in gross over all 
uses of the word “Duke” or “Devil” or “Blue” or the letter “D.” True, 
Duke could in theory slap its name on any domain of goods and 
services—and thus claim that it effectively controlled the word 
“Duke.” But the premise proves too much; 193 other “Duke” trade-
mark owners could claim the same thing. 
C. Anti-Dilution 
The second expansion of trademark law beyond its traditional 
boundaries comes from the creation of federal anti-dilution protec-
tion for famous brands.94 If a mark is famous with the general con-
suming public, section 43(c) of the Lanham Act conveys extra pro-
tections beyond the prohibitions on simple trademark infringement95 
and misleading source identification.96 This right is an expansive 
 
v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 118 F. 
Supp. 2d 92, 99 (D. Mass. 2000). 
90 Lemley, supra note 81, at 1708–09. 
91 See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D. 
Minn. 1998); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 418. 
92 See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 24:10 (5th ed. 2020). 
93 See Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. at 173. 
94 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
95 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
96 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
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one that rejects most of the normal limitations on trademarks. The 
statute reads: 
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a fa-
mous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through 
acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an in-
junction against another person who, at any time af-
ter the owner’s mark has become famous, com-
mences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that 
is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the 
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of 
competition, or of actual economic injury.97 
It is hard to find compelling policy reasons for the creation of 
federal anti-dilution protection, other than circular arguments, polit-
ical capture and the nostrum that “to those that have, more shall be 
given.” Famous marks might seem to be least in need of extra pro-
tection, but they are singled out and given that protection because of 
their fame. Yet precisely because of the absence of trademark law’s 
normal limitations—no requirement of actual or likely confusion, 
competition or economic injury—both Congress and the courts have 
had to trim the extent of the resulting right. 
To begin with, the protection is stated to be one that is “subject 
to the principles of equity,” and it specifically excludes fair, nomi-
native or descriptive uses, comparative advertising, identification, 
parody, commentary, criticism, news reporting, and non-commer-
cial uses of the mark.98 Arguably, the First Amendment required at 
least some of those limitations since, by doing away with trademark 
law’s traditional limitations such as the requirements of competi-
tion, confusion, and activity-specificity, Congress is operating on 
the edge of its powers. In preventing the likelihood of consumer 
confusion in the marketplace, Congress’s powers to restrain speech 
are well-defined and justified. When confusion, competition, and 
economic harm are explicitly stated to be irrelevant to the statutory 
violation, Congress’s authority is more dubious and the restraints 
imposed seem both more draconian and less justifiable—a straight 
 
97 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
98 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). 
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semantic land-grab that takes uses that otherwise would be in the 
public domain and conveys them to a private party, thus restraining 
otherwise constitutionally protected speech acts for no identifiable 
public purpose.99 
Next, Congress amended the anti-dilution provisions to require 
that the mark be famous among the general consuming public, doing 
away with the idea of “niche fame”—fame in a particular market 
segment.100 Courts have proven attentive to the importance of this 
limitation. Coach Services, the makers of the eponymous handbags, 
might seem to be a very famous brand. They certainly believed they 
were. But when they sued a company that wanted to use the mark 
“Coach” for learning software, designed to train students in how to 
pass standardized tests, they discovered that the courts set the bar 
for fame very high, particularly “where, as here, the mark is a com-
mon English word that has different meanings in different con-
texts.”101 “Coach,” like “Duke,” is a word that has multiple mean-
ings, only a single one of which is related to the allegedly famous 
mark. At the very least that makes it much harder to satisfy the re-
quirements of fame. By contrast, a coined word such as “Google,” 
existing only in the context of a particular good or service, has a 
much stronger case. Owners of well-known marks frequently assert 
that they are “famous.” Duke does so repeatedly in its oppositions. 
But the lay, and legal, senses of that word are distinct. Duke’s case 
for legal fame is very weak. 
In addition, for a finding of dilution by blurring, the courts are 
instructed to look to “the extent to which the owner of the famous 
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.”102 
 
99 Cf. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 561 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
100 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
101 Coach Services v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It 
is well-established that dilution fame is difficult to prove.”); see also Toro Co. v. ToroHead 
Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1164, 1180 (T.T.A.B. 2001) (“Fame for dilution purposes is difficult 
to prove.”); Everest Capital, Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt. LLC, 393 F.3d 755, 763 (8th Cir. 
2005) (“The judicial consensus is that ‘famous’ is a rigorous standard.”); 4 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:104 (noting that 
fame for dilution is “a difficult and demanding requirement” and that, although “all 
‘trademarks’ are ‘distinctive’—very few are ‘famous’”). 
102 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii). 
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Again, unlike a company such as Google, Duke is not. Indeed, there 
are 193 federally registered marks having nothing to do with Duke 
University that include the word “Duke.” These other registered 
marks give ample evidence of the multiple possible meanings of the 
word Duke, from aristocrat, to a pugilist’s fists, to a slang term for 
eminence, to a nickname, or relatively common surname, but they 
also show that the term is being used in commerce—as a mark—by 
many others. Some of those marks are surprising. For example, 
Duke’s booster club is called the “Iron Dukes,” named after a group 
of 1938 Duke football players whose defense was legendary. Noth-
ing might seem more central to Duke’s trademark holdings. Yet 
there is a registered mark for “Iron Duke” for wheat flour,103 dating 
from 1920, long before the actual Iron Dukes played on Duke’s foot-
ball team or the booster club adopted that name. Wikipedia helpfully 
supplies multiple other uses of the phrase, including seven people, 
four ships, two trains, an engine, a film, a pub, and a novel.104 And 
that is the unusual coinage “Iron Duke.” What about “Duke” itself? 
Substantially exclusive use of the mark? 193 others say “no.” 
Thus, in our opinion, it is clear that “Duke”—standing alone—
is not famous, and in any event is not entitled to protection from 
“blurring” by other users of this English word. There is an argument 
that “Duke Blue Devils” might be famous, though Duke does not 
own a federally registered mark in the full composite phrase, and 
there are others with “Blue Devil” marks. Writing this Article in 
basketball-mad North Carolina, the aura of fame seems plausible. 
Yet it is worth repeating that the current anti-dilution law, as a price 
for the extraordinary broad rights it grants, did away with the notion 
of “niche fame”—fame in a particular market segment—instead re-
quiring fame among the general consuming public. When the Uni-
versity of Texas, Duke’s only real competitor in aggressive trade-
mark assertion, claimed that its Texas Longhorns logo was famous, 
the (brave, Western District of Texas) judge had this to say: 
One of the central revisions of the TDRA was to 
make it more difficult to get the “rights in gross” that 
 
103 IRON DUKE, Registration No. 134,297. 
104 Iron Duke, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_Duke  
[https://perma.cc/6YBC-PPS2]. 
442 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387 
 
a famous mark is entitled to. Getting rid of niche 
fame, the federal trademark law (as already noted) 
now requires that the mark be “widely recognized by 
the general consuming public of the United States.” 
And the central problem for UT is that its circum-
stantial evidence is largely evidence of niche market 
fame. Reading through the evidence, it is not at all 
clear that if one is not a college football fan (or, to a 
much lesser extent, college baseball or basketball 
fan) would recognize the [Longhorn Logo] as being 
associated with UT, as all of the evidence relates to 
the use of the logo in sporting events. The Court is 
well aware that NCAA college football is a popular 
sport—the Court counts itself as a more than casual 
fan of Saturday afternoon football in the Fall but this 
hardly equals a presence with the general consuming 
public (nearly the entire population of the United 
States). Simply because UT athletics have achieved 
a level of national prominence does not necessarily 
mean that the longhorn logo is so ubiquitous and 
well-known to stand toe-to-toe with Buick or 
KODAK.105 
The reasoning here seems directly apposite to Duke’s marks. We 
all live inside our regional or leisure bubbles and that makes it hard 
to judge, but the requirement of national fame to the general con-
suming public of the United States is a daunting one. If “Duke Blue 
Devils” did satisfy the requirements for fame, then the protection 
would only allow it to enjoin marks that seemed likely to blur or 
tarnish the entire mark, not its component parts. That protection 
would be exceedingly narrow. 
Finally, even where the mark did meet the threshold of fame, in 
applying the anti-dilution provisions courts have been reluctant to 
find infringement. Perhaps this is because of the inconsistency of the 
right with trademark’s larger rationale and the possibility for abuse 
of the right it provides. Unlike “Duke” or “Coach,” “Starbucks” and 
 
105 Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. ex rel. Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. KST Elec., Ltd., 
550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 678 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (internal citations omitted). 
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“Louis Vuitton” are unique words and phrases.106 Courts accord-
ingly found that both of them were famous within the meaning of 
the statute. Given the breadth of the legal protection conferred, one 
would expect therefore that a competitor’s use of “Charbucks” (for 
coffee!) or “Chewy Vuiton” (for doggy chew toys covered in the 
Louis Vuitton logo!) were guilty of either blurring or tarnishment. 
The courts found that they were not.107 
Large brands love the protection of anti-dilution since it appears 
to free them of trademark law’s pesky requirements to show likely 
confusion, competition, injury and so on. But trademark owners are 
much more likely to threaten to use anti-dilution than to litigate it to 
conclusion, because they know that the courts view such claims 
skeptically, that the thresholds for both gaining the right and infring-
ing it are extremely high, and they wish to avoid a contrary ruling. 
This is a saber more frequently rattled than used. Duke’s oppositions 
are consistent with that fact. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
A. Maximalism Beyond Duke 
Trademark oppositions are the visible, and publicly searchable, 
tip of the iceberg. You have to go on the record and you have to give 
reasons. But the maximalism we describe here is by no means con-
fined to trademark oppositions or to Duke. At the beginning of the 
Article, we pointed out that Duke is not alone among universities in 
“aggressive” trademark claims and that oppositions are only a tiny 
fraction of the totality of trademark assertion. For example, Boise 
State’s football team plays on a blue football field. It claimed a 
trademark in blue football fields. But in 2010, it decided that this 
was not enough. It decided to claim that all non-green sporting fields 
would infringe its trademark: 
 
106 Lovers of Moby Dick might demur. 
107 See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 213 (2d Cir. 
2013); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252, 269 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
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Citing a legal doctrine called initial interest confu-
sion, which means Boise State has the right to license 
or deny any field that could be mistakenly associated 
with its trademark, the university expanded its trade-
mark from blue to non-green in 2010.108 
Though it apparently convinced The New York Times that 
merely by saying things—“Abracadabra!” “Initial interest confu-
sion!”—it could magically “expand[] its trademark from blue to 
non-green,” Boise State is mistaken. Its claim is just as far-fetched 
as the Duke oppositions we discussed. Indeed, it might be more so. 
One can claim a trademark in a color. The Supreme Court held this 
in a case called Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. But the Court 
explicitly said that the reason it would consider colors eligible for 
trademarks was because it felt that the dangers of overreach, and of 
denying other colors to potential competitors, were constrained by 
limitations internal to the law, particularly the functionality doc-
trine: 
When a color serves as a mark, normally alternative 
colors will likely be available for similar use by oth-
ers. Moreover, if that is not so—if a “color depletion” 
or “color scarcity” problem does arise—the trade-
mark doctrine of “functionality” normally would 
seem available to prevent the anti competitive conse-
quences that Jacobson’s [the party opposing the 
mark] argument posits, thereby minimizing that ar-
gument’s practical force….Although we need not 
comment on the merits of specific cases, we note that 
lower courts have permitted competitors to copy the 
green color of farm machinery (because customers 
wanted their farm equipment to match) and have 
barred the use of black as a trademark on outboard 
boat motors (because black has the special functional 
attributes of decreasing the apparent size of the mo-
tor and ensuring compatibility with many different 
boat colors). The upshot is that, where a color serves 
a significant nontrademark function…courts will 
 
108 Fortier, supra note 3. We owe the examples to Mark Lemley. 
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examine whether its use as a mark would permit one 
competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate 
(nontrademark-related) competition through actual 
or potential exclusive use of an important product  
ingredient…ordinarily, it should prevent the anti-
competitive consequences of Jacobson’s hypothet-
ical “color depletion” argument, when, and if, the  
circumstances of a particular case threaten “color  
depletion.”109 
Thus, the last thing a court would allow is the expansion of a 
trademark on blue football fields into all non-green football fields. 
If courts are coming to the rescue of mariners who are asking, “Does 
this motor make my boat look big?” or fashion-forward farmers who 
worry about color-coordinating their tractors, they are hardly about 
to hand over a legal monopoly in all non-green athletic fields merely 
because someone says “Trademark!” It is hard to think of a clearer 
case of color depletion that would interfere with competition. Boise 
State is misusing trademark law. The doctrine on which it apparently 
relied, “initial interest confusion,” does not change that fact. It is a 
controversial idea, of dubious relevance to this kind of case, from 
which courts have increasingly backed away.110 So this is a misuse 
of trademark law that, if it were to be believed or acceded to, would 
restrict competition unnecessarily. Yet it would not show up as an 
opposition or cancellation proceeding. 
 
109 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168–70 (1995). 
110 See Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 315–17 (4th Cir. 2005) (expressing 
skepticism about initial interest confusion and limiting its application to “use of another 
firm’s mark to capture the markholder’s customers and profits”); Vail Assocs., Inc. v. 
Vend-Tel-Co., 516 F.3d 853, 872 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] court cannot simply assume a 
likelihood of initial interest confusion, even if it suspects it. The proponent of such a theory 
must prove it.”); Sensient Techs. Corp. v. Sensory Effects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754, 766 
(8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1270 (2011) (declining to apply initial interest 
confusion when “customers are sophisticated and exercise a relatively high degree of care 
in making their purchasing decisions”); Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, 
423 F.3d 539, 551 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting initial interest confusion in cases involving 
alleged infringement of product shape trade dress); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial 
Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
105, 122 (2005). 
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Or what about universities that wish to use trademark, or more 
correctly “the appearance of trademark language in a nasty lawyer’s 
letter with no legal basis,” to police their image? NYU managed to 
get the TV show Felicity to change the name of the university in the 
show because the students it featured were sexually active.111 Of 
course, we see NYU’s point. Nothing could be more foreign to the 
college experience than sexual experimentation. Stanford Univer-
sity got a movie called Stealing Stanford to change its title because 
the plot featured a student who stole in order to afford tuition.112 One 
of us, a Harvard alumnus, is delighted that the movie title was 
changed to “Stealing Harvard.” Apparently, Harvard made no ob-
jection. These two threats, of course, have no basis in trademark law. 
They are an attempt illicitly to use trademark language to police im-
age—a subject that goes beyond the issues of trademark opposition 
we discuss here and yet is illuminated by them. 
The Ohio State University is unlikely to get a trademark over the 
definite article.113 Boise State does not “own” the concept of all non-
green sports fields. Stanford and NYU are not legally entitled to pro-
hibit writers of fiction from depicting their students stealing or being 
sexually active. The Associated Press story with which we began 
this Article also mentions examples of bullying from NC State, the 
University of Minnesota, and Texas A&M. The University of 
Texas’s thirty trademark oppositions, and its attempts to claim “fa-
mous mark” status, show that Duke’s conduct is not as isolated as it 
might seem. 
Still, Duke is an outlier. Based on the empirical and legal analy-
sis we present here, it appears undeniable that Duke is a trademark 
bully. The Comparative Study shows just how anomalous Duke’s 
oppositions are—substantially exceeding all of the oppositions 
raised by all twenty-eight other universities in our three comparison 
 
111 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 420. 
112 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 6, at 421. Ignoring the correct method to gain 
entrance to Stanford, which of course, is fraudulently pretending to be a student on the 
sailing team. See Matthias Gafni & Evan Sernoffsky, 13 Bay Area Parents and Stanford 
Sailing Coach Implicated in College Admissions Bribery Scandal, S.F. CHRONICLE (Mar. 
12, 2019, 6:32 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Stanford-sailing-team-
implicated-in-college-13682141.php [https://perma.cc/JJ73-RGSJ]. 
113 See supra Introduction. 
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groups, combined. That fact alone ought to raise concerns. The 
Merit Study showed that Duke reaches such gaudy numbers only by 
making claims that are not well-grounded in trademark law. Over a 
four-year period, we found that 85% of its oppositions were either 
clearly erroneous or far-fetched. We felt that we gave Duke the ben-
efit of the doubt in many cases but even if our coding were system-
atically too harsh and we changed the ratings accordingly, Duke’s 
behavior would still be problematic. For example, if we bumped all 
our assessments up one grade in Duke’s favor—making all of the 
clearly erroneous oppositions merely far-fetched, and so on—then 
Duke would still look like a trademark bully, with 55% of its actions 
being rated as far-fetched and only 15% as sound. 
Of course, we assume that Duke’s actions were taken in good 
faith. But they seem to reflect both a deep legal mistake and a ques-
tionable institutional premise. To begin with, they rest on a system-
atic misunderstanding of both the law and policy of trademark. Next, 
they rest on an aggressive, but perhaps not well thought-out, inten-
tion to position Duke as an entity that sells everything—and a fa-
mous one at that—giving it a right of near total control of “Duke,” 
“Blue,” “Devil,” the letter D, and so on. It is the combination of 
those two misunderstandings that makes Duke such an outlier in 
both the quantity and the quality of its trademark objections, but also 
perhaps a useful warning about tendencies in collegiate trademark 
maximalism. 
B. Why Bully? 
This brings us back to the question we raised earlier: why is 
Duke doing this? Why might other universities follow suit? Trade-
mark oppositions are expensive. Estimates in the scholarly literature 
range from $90,000 to $500,000 in legal costs to pursue an opposi-
tion through every possible stage of the process.114 (The latter num-
ber seems implausibly high to us.) The wide variation appears to 
 
114 Kiser, supra note 24, at 223 (citing B. Brett Heavner & Marcus H.H. Luepke, 
Avoiding Trademark Pitfalls in the “Land of the Unlimited Possibilities”: The Top 15 
Mistakes of Foreign Applicants in the U.S. Trademark Office, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 974, 
990 (2008); AMERICAN INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2011 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 
(July 2011), https://www.aipla.org/detail/journal-issue/2011-report-of-the-economic-
survey [https://perma.cc/U98D-3E2L]). 
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derive from different assumptions about which legal actions would 
be pursued. However, these numbers exaggerate the routine costs. 
Frequently, Duke can get its way with a legal “nastygram” that costs 
only a few hours of lawyer time to produce. Many other oppositions 
settle quickly, keeping costs down. Nevertheless, the vigor of the 
formal opposition practice we studied here shows that Duke is will-
ing to sink expensive institutional resources into an activity that ap-
pears, at best, pointless—even if one ignored the ethical concerns. 
Imagine a classic homo economicus administrator at Duke  
deciding whether to oppose “Bluefood,” “Blue Ball Chillers,” or 
“D’Grill” for barbecue smokers and grills. On one side, her analysis 
would measure costs to Duke in the form of direct legal expenses 
and perhaps indirect harm to reputation if it were seen as legally 
unscrupulous. She would then weigh those against the likely bene-
fits which the opposition might produce or the harms that it might 
forestall. At the outset, the precise legal costs of any individual ac-
tion would be unknown. Duke cannot know whether this particular 
counterparty will fight the issue out to the bitter end or fold at the 
first nasty letter. But Duke is nothing if not a repeat player in this 
market. It would have a very good estimate of aggregate possibilities 
and thus the associated costs over a year’s worth of oppositions. 
What benefits go on the other side of the scale? 
First, there is the much-cited danger of abandonment. With ex-
amples like the ones we used above—and indeed with all of the op-
positions coded 1 (clearly erroneous) and 2 (far-fetched)—that dan-
ger does not exist. A rational, legally informed cost-benefit analyst 
would know that. Second, there is speculative future harm to Duke’s 
brand and to markets for Duke products and services. Again, at least 
with the oppositions coded 1 and 2, it is hard to see that possibility—
even assuming, as we did, that Duke is entitled to all the consumer 
surplus from both Source Buyers and Affiliation Signalers. To put 
it another way, even if Duke gets every available dollar from the 
sales of “Duke” and “Blue Devil” merchandise, “D’Grill” for bar-
becue smokers and grills poses no threat to current or future markets. 
So, at least with many of the oppositions, we have a hefty cost and 
no apparent benefit. Rational actor theory tells us, therefore, that 
these oppositions should not exist—the decision that many of our 
sister institutions seem to have made. E pur si muove. Why? 
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1. Trademark Law’s Poor Incentives 
Part of the blame must be put on trademark law. For example, 
trademark law can be used to raise competitors’ costs and erect bar-
riers to entry. All legal rights can be misused, of course, and wealthy 
parties with good legal representation will often be able to work the 
system to their advantage. Yet the indeterminacy of intellectual 
property rights makes them particularly susceptible to overbroad 
claims—thus allowing them to be used to subvert the marketplace 
they are supposed to protect. In a fascinating series of interviews 
with intellectual property counsel, Professor William Gallagher 
found that attorneys were frank about this aspect of the law. 
Q: Has that happened in a recent trademark case for 
you, where you represent a big client and are trying 
to enforce a weak case on the merits, weak in your 
opinion? 
 
A: Oh yeah! (laughs) I’ve had a case recently where 
I think we were probably wrong on the merits….The 
lawyer on the other side was yelling at me about we 
didn’t have a case, and I said you must be confusing 
me with somebody who cares about the merits. We 
are the giant in this case and we’ve decided we’re not 
going to tolerate this, we’re not going to give up. 
 
Q: Was that effective? 
 
A: Yeah, it worked. They gave up. We just didn’t 
want this individual using the client’s mark. They’re 
no threat to us, a different world, very different ser-
vices. No real likelihood of confusion. But we just 
didn’t want them to use it, use their mark.115 
In that case, fault lies with the bully that knows it is overreaching 
but “doesn’t care about the merits.” The lawyer who made such a 
claim arguably committed a sanctionable ethical violation. But it 
also lies with a trademark system that had a chance to impose 
 
115 Gallagher, supra note 25, at 485–86. 
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penalties for trademark bullying, or introduce higher standards, but 
has chosen so far largely to minimize the problem. In that case, 
trademark law is guilty of a sin of omission, a failure to remedy 
abuse, but it has also set up poor incentives for trademark owners, 
ones which encourage overreaching. For example, courts sometimes 
look at the vigor with which a particular trademark is defended in 
assessing the “strength of the mark” in a trademark action. Thus, the 
existence of similar marks on products and services that are vaguely 
adjacent to the mark-holders’ business could count against a trade-
mark holder in an infringement action. Professor Stacy Dogan, her-
self a frequent critic of trademark bullying, argues that this produces 
perverse incentives: 
[T]he law has not only failed in its function of delin-
eating clear boundaries of trademark holder rights; it 
has arguably made things worse, by defining trade-
marks’ value, at least in part, by reference to uses that 
fall outside any reasonable definition of those bound-
aries….When a lawyer for Monster Energy Drinks 
recommended that the company object to a brew-
ery’s sale of Vermonster beer, she probably did not 
perceive any real risk of confusion or dilution of the 
Monster Energy marks. But she may well have con-
cluded that objecting to any drink-related use of 
monster would help to preserve the strength of her 
client’s mark, in general, in future cases. This doesn’t 
mean that the world is better off as a result of that 
action; but it does mean that the accused bully had a 
plausible reason for its aggression. If we want to curb 
that aggression, we should modify trademark law’s 
incentives.116 
Professor Dogan’s point is well-taken. Trademark doctrine en-
courages, or at least does not deter, some trademark bullying. Duke 
is not acting in a legal vacuum. But that explanation has limitations. 
Most of Duke’s clearly erroneous and far-fetched oppositions are in 
fields that are not even arguably similar. At least Vermonster beer 
was a drink. Duke’s oppositions go beyond any tactical rationale of 
 
116 Dogan, supra note 25, at 1321–22. 
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opposing similar marks on similar goods and services—unless Duke 
thinks trademark law allows it to control dissimilar marks on all 
goods and services. Even trademark law’s harshest critic would not 
claim it sends that message currently. 
Herman Kahn, the game theorist, famously suggested that the 
best tactic in a game of “chicken” between two drivers is to throw 
the steering wheel out of the window, showing the other driver that 
you could not change course.117 Cultivating a reputation as a trade-
mark bully could provide such benefits. If I demonstrate to you that 
I will oppose everything, no matter how legally ungrounded my 
claims, you might be dissuaded in the future from doing something 
that might harm me. Yet for that strategy to be worthwhile, the  
prospect of harm—or benefit—has to be real at least some of the 
time. There is a cost to jettisoning the steering wheel. Kahn was  
assuming that there was a prize for the game of chicken. Even given 
Professor Dogan’s argument, it is not clear that Duke’s actions  
actually produce any such prize. Throwing the steering wheel out of 
the window when there isn’t a game of chicken going on seems less 
rational. Nevertheless, the possibility of gaming behavior has to be 
considered and right now trademark law has inadequate remedies 
against it. 
Trademark’s anti-dilution right provides another set of poorly 
aligned incentives. As we previously pointed out, the creation of 
federal protection for famous marks expands trademark protection 
beyond its normal boundaries and limitations. The owner of a fa-
mous mark can enjoin other similar marks even in the absence of 
competition, actual or likely confusion, or economic injury. The 
anti-dilution right looks a lot closer to an absolute right over a name 
or symbol than anything Federal law had previously offered. What 
rational, dutiful lawyer would not want that protection for his or her 
client? Does the attempt to win famous mark status, the anti-dilution 
long game, explain Duke’s behavior? Again, that can only be a par-
tial explanation. Congress and the courts have been clear about how 
hard it is to get “famous mark” designation. A university which has 
as its name a common English word with multiple other meanings 
 
117 See HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS 11 (Transaction 
Publishers, 2009) (1968). 
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and which also has to deal with 193 owners of other federally regis-
tered “Duke” marks has a vanishingly small chance of clearing the 
high bar the law sets up. “Duke Blue Devils” has a better chance at 
achieving famous mark status, but Duke does not confine its claims 
of famous mark status to that mark. If “Duke” were a coined word 
like “Google” and if those 193 other marks did not exist, then ag-
gressive opposition of even clearly unrelated products would make 
more sense. Since neither of those is the case, trademark law’s in-
centives can be, at best, a partial explanation. 
One reason we wrote this Article was that we thought a close 
focus on Duke’s behavior might help to highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of trademark doctrine more broadly. We think it did. In 
each of the areas where trademark law has arguably invited over-
reach—a hypertrophied franchising right divorced from trademark’s 
rationale, ludicrous assertions of sponsorship and affiliation that no 
rational person would perceive, and overbroad claims of famous 
mark status—Duke has taken the invitation, despite the fact that 
these are clearly outliers on which the courts and Congress have set 
constraints. Trademark law is part of the problem and any solution 
needs to be directed at the law’s incentives generally, not just on 
Duke’s actions. But, as we have suggested here, this explanation has 
limits and Duke’s range of opposition appears to exceed those limits 
substantially. Moreover, if this were an entirely rational response to 
changes in trademark law, one would expect that other universities’ 
actions would mirror Duke’s. So far, they have not, though that 
seems to be changing. A “rational,” albeit overreaching, legal strat-
egy based around trademark law’s incentives, then, can be only part 
of the explanation. 
2. The Behavioral Economics of Trademark Maximalism 
At least in the US system, intellectual property rights are utili-
tarian—designed to produce a particular result.118 We encourage 
creators by granting them copyrights and patents in order to incen-
tivize the next creator, not to reward hard work or because we be-
lieve that there is an absolute and natural right in one’s books or 
 
118 Most scholars would say this is true of all property rights, but it is more obviously 
true of intellectual property rights. 
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inventions. We protect trademarks in order to avoid consumer con-
fusion and to simplify and incentivize benign information flow in 
the market. It is for those reasons that intellectual property rights are 
so limited. The copyright protects only original expression: facts and 
ideas go immediately into the public domain, free for all to use. The 
trademark does not convey ownership of a word or symbol, or the 
right to engage in semantic policing of speech you do not like, ab-
sent plausible consumer confusion. Rightsholders, however, may 
have a more simplistic conception of their rights, believing that they 
approach sole despotic dominion. One of us has written about the 
ways in which an absolute, physicalist conception of intellectual 
property rights can lead to overbroad claims and socially harmful 
policy proposals.119 A rightsholder in this position is not consciously 
overreaching. They come to believe that they have the right to police 
mentions of their university in television shows or the color of other 
college’s football fields. 
This jurisprudential maximalism may be connected to a particu-
lar set of psychological traits. In a fascinating article, Professor Jes-
sica Kiser argues that behavioral economics—in particular, prospect 
theory—helps to explain apparently “irrational” examples of trade-
mark bullying: occasions where an objective calculation of loss and 
gain would deter neo-classical economics’ rational actor from bul-
lying behavior, but the psychological biases identified by behavioral 
economics explain the action.120 Behavioral economics argues that 
actors put a disproportionate weight on losses as opposed to gains, 
and that there is a corresponding effect that causes individuals to 
overvalue the certainty with which a loss can be avoided.121 Con-
sider, for example, irrationally expensive but psychologically attrac-
tive consumer warranties; did you get Applecare because you be-
lieved that, if you did not, the regret you felt if the computer broke 
would be so much worse? Behavioral economics also postulates that 
 
119 James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 
DUKE L.J. 87–116 (1997); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the 
Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 33–74 
(Winter/Spring 2003); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF 
THE MIND 21–22 (2008). 
120 Kiser, supra note 24, at 232, 235. 
121 Kiser, supra note 24, at 235–36. 
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decisions are strongly influenced by a number of “baseline” assump-
tions, such as the endowment effect, where actors will value some-
thing more highly if told they already have a property right in it, or 
the sunk cost fallacy, where actors irrationally continue actions be-
cause they cannot bear to write off the amount of money that has 
already been spent on them.122 Kiser argues that all of these factors 
may be present in the case of apparently irrational trademark bully-
ing: 
Even if an attorney tells her client that failure to stop 
all remotely infringing or diluting trademark use 
rarely results in the abandonment of a trademark, that 
attorney is unlikely to offer a promise of certainty 
that the trademark is safe. Thus, the client is faced 
with a low probability of risk that a third party some-
where in the marketplace, selling a potentially unre-
lated product with a remotely similar trademark, 
could harm the client’s own trademark rights. A 
completely rational client would determine that such 
a risk minimal, and only invest a small sum of money 
into monitoring the third party usage or countering 
any concerning usage with increased advertising 
presence. But the certainty effect may cause the cli-
ent to overvalue certainty, and push for reducing risk 
of harm to the trademark to zero…. Additional stud-
ies have indicated that “endowment effects will al-
most certainly occur when owners are faced with the 
opportunity to sell an item purchased for use that is 
not easily replaceable.” Given the unique nature of 
trademarks and the fact that they cannot easily be 
bought or sold on an open market, they are in a sense 
irreplaceable; consequently, a strong endowment ef-
fect should be expected to impact decisions of trade-
mark owners…. This suggests that trademark owners 
may overvalue their trademark assets and then invest 
 
122 One of us has argued that universities are subject to this fallacy, despite the fact that 
one of their roles is to train their students to avoid such cognitive errors. James Boyle, Our 
China Syndrome, THE CHRONICLE (Dec. 6, 2016, 10:57 AM), https://www.duke 
chronicle.com/article/2016/12/our-china-syndrome [https://perma.cc/G8PX-FK94]. 
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irrationally large amounts of time and money into 
preventing a loss of those trademarks, even if such a 
loss is incredibly unlikely…. Calling the trademarks 
“crown jewels,” or viewing them as on par with tan-
gible property, illustrates the tendency of trademark 
owners to elevate the status of trademarks to some-
thing more significant than mere business assets. 
Trademark bullying behavior should be expected in 
light of the endowment effect’s interaction with the 
uncertain requirements of trademark law’s duty to 
police.123 
If this were true, the combination of jurisprudential maximalist 
assumptions about the right’s reach, the demands of loss aversion 
(which overestimates the threat of abandonment) and the endow-
ment effect might combine to produce a pattern of over-zealous as-
sertion of trademark rights. The sunk cost fallacy might then im-
munize that pattern from rational review. “We have gone after all 
these other (non-threatening) brands, what is one more?” 
This obviously begs one vital question. If these psychological 
traits and jurisprudential assumptions are widely available, why 
would they affect Duke so much more than any other university in 
terms of its opposition practice? We have no completely satisfactory 
answer, but we can see two possibilities. 
First, legal consciousness could be more local and less suscepti-
ble to correction by rational introspection than the “convergent wis-
dom of well-lawyered crowds” hypothesis would suggest. Anecdo-
tally, we have observed the formation of path-dependent microcul-
tures of legal attitude. Because of a particular controversy or the 
views of an influential individual, a single corporate entity or bu-
reaucratic department develops a “house view” that is markedly at 
odds with the rest of legal culture, and then propagates that view 
internally through groupthink so that the variance is preserved. In 
intellectual property law, some have argued for such a phenomenon 
in terms of the patent jurisprudence of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, the internet policy of the Clinton Administration 
 
123 Kiser, supra note 24, at 240, 242. 
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PTO, and the copyright litigation of the Church of Scientology or 
the company Perfect 10.124 Perhaps Duke is such a microculture. 
Second, Duke might be a trendsetter. Right now, Duke’s behav-
ior seems both anomalous and ungrounded, but perhaps it is merely 
the first university to embrace the psychological framing that Kiser 
and others describe. Universities still see themselves as serving dif-
ferent imperatives than for-profit corporations. Perhaps that insula-
tion from the behavioral economics of bullying is eroding and 
Duke’s behavior offers us a vision of the future. The Associated 
Press story quoted at the beginning of this Article suggests that this 
might indeed be the case, as do the Boise State, Stanford, and NYU 
stories.125 Our Comparative Study also picked up hints that univer-
sities were moving in Duke’s direction in their opposition practice. 
Do you want to help launch a “cancer moonshot”? Beware. The Uni-
versity of Texas, which has applied for marks on variations of this 
term, has opposed its use by others.126 Also, do not try and register 
a mark which includes the American Sign Language hand gesture 
for “I love you” or the heavy metaler’s similar gesture. The same 
university assiduously protects its mark over a “hook ‘em, horns” 
logo, even when the context or field of use seem very different.127 
Do you believe that the fans of your team count as a “12th man” on 
the field? Texas A&M has a trademark over the term and has assid-
uously opposed others who attempt to register variants of it.128 And 
of course, The Ohio State University is famously trying to trademark 
 
124 See generally Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F. 3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); see Stuart Minor 
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2008); James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A 
Young Person's Guide, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 47, 60 (1996).  
125 Binkley, supra note 8. 
126 Opp’n No. 91,230,927 (filed Nov. 1, 2016). 
127 “The mark consists of the representation of a human hand with the index and small 
fingers extended upward and the thumb closed over the middle and ring fingers,” 
Registration No. 4,535,612. 
128 Other oppositions included “Texas Strong,” opposed by the University of Texas and 
“We are the Aggie Network,” a cancellation filed by Texas A&M. See TEXAS STRONG, 
Opp’n No. 91,222,975 (filed July 27, 2015); WE ARE THE AGGIE NETWORK, Opp’n 
No. 92,063,077 (filed Jan. 22, 2016). In these cases, the universities appear to be trying to 
become the sole controller of fan sentiment. In both cases, the universities lost. 
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“The.”129 Both in terms of semantic policing—attempting to guard 
the image of the university in ways that go far beyond trademark 
law’s actual boundaries—and in terms of merchandising and brand-
ing, universities seem to be moving in Duke’s direction. As this Ar-
ticle has tried to show, that would be unfortunate and, arguably, un-
just. Though this Article focused on Duke, its conclusion is that uni-
versities generally should chart a different path—toward practices 
that hew more closely to the goals of both trademark law and of 
educational institutions. 
Regardless of the causal route for Duke’s outlier status, some 
will argue that we are being overly generous to Duke in offering the 
“innocent” behavioral economic explanation. We believe, however, 
that the comments of university officials provide support for that 
more generous explanation, echoing Kiser’s themes of a supremely 
valuable asset that must be protected both from a much-overstated 
threat of abandonment and from a variety of misuses, some of which 
fit poorly under trademark law.130 
Some analytical clarity might be useful. Trademark bullying cre-
ates two distinct classes of harms. The most obvious one happens if 
the conduct is intentional or just reckless in its lack of care. To assert 
rights beyond the boundaries of existing law, perhaps in the belief 
that my deep pockets will guarantee “a win” regardless of the merits, 
is a harm to the integrity of the legal system and violates the indi-
vidual ethical duty to act truthfully and within the boundaries of the 
law. The bully is relying on size to gain resources it does not de-
serve, or to deny those resources to others. That is why they call it 
“bullying.” But what if the entity is simply honestly mistaken, or 
systematically deluded, about the limits of trademark law, perhaps 
under the influence of the behavioral economic framing effects men-
tioned above? In that case, some would argue that it is a misnomer 
to call it “a bully.” 
The person who forcibly takes my school lunch because he truly 
believes it to be his lunch is not exactly a “bully,” though he may be 
wanting in judgment. Of course, if the trademark overstatements are 
routine and routinely ridiculed, then the claim of honest mistake or 
 
129 See supra Introduction. 
130 McCarthy, supra note 18.  
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delusion may meet with skepticism. If someone takes my lunch re-
peatedly, for years on end, even when he is repeatedly told by me 
and others that it isn’t his lunch, and he is a bully for taking it,131 we 
might be dubious about his claims of innocence. 
Yet it is important to understand that, even if it were truly a case 
of large-scale, persistent honest mistake, there is a second social 
harm: routine over-assertion of intellectual property rights damages 
legitimate competition and protected speech. Businesses that had a 
right to their non-confusing trademark in a different field are losing 
something they were entitled to, and the public is losing marks that 
might usefully have suggested goods and services they want. In a 
thought-provoking recent empirical study, Barton Beebe and Jeanne 
Fromer present evidence that we are “running out of trademarks.”132 
They argue that the conventional wisdom that there is an ample sup-
ply of unclaimed, competitively effective trademarks is wrong, and 
that “rates of word-mark depletion and congestion are increasing 
and have reached chronic levels.”133 It is important to note that this 
can happen even when trademark law is functioning as envisioned; 
if Duke can not only claim “Blue Devils” but will routinely oppose 
marks that use the word “blue”—from “True Blue” for auto parts to 
“Stay Blue” for denim clothing—then this considerably exacerbates 
the depletion of useful words. Moreover, entities who are told they 
must change the title of their movie, make the fictional, sexually ac-
tive college students in their TV show go to a different university, 
or refrain from playing their sports on a non-green field—all be-
cause of a ludicrous claim of trademark infringement—are being 
harmed. So are their potential customers and viewers and fans. And 
this second set of harms to speech and competition exists regardless 
of the intention of the actor involved. 
 
131 See Biggest Bullies, supra note 10 (listing the multiple news stories and surveys that 
have rated Duke a trademark bully). 
132 Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An 
Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 945 
(2018). 
133 Id. at 947. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Comparative Study showed that Duke is a dramatic outlier, 
bringing substantially more trademark oppositions than all twenty-
eight other universities in our three comparison groups combined. 
The Merit Study showed that most of those oppositions are legally 
ungrounded, with 85% being assessed as “clearly erroneous” or 
“far-fetched.” Our analysis argued that this behavior was linked both 
to changes in trademark law and to the conception of the university’s 
role as a mega-brand, changes which appear to have affected Duke 
more than other universities, but which have wider implications. As-
sume for the sake of argument that you are persuaded by some of 
our analysis. Where’s the harm? It seems clear that Duke is over-
stepping its bounds legally speaking, and that it might be a harbinger 
of more general changes in university culture. Still, who cares? We 
should. 
Universities should stand for the truth. If (and we stress “if”) 
they knowingly pursue spurious claims that are not in fact grounded 
in existing law, they harm their own ethics and the integrity of the 
legal system. We have suggested a more charitable explanation than 
knowing misuse here. Still, once made aware of the pattern, the uni-
versity has an ethical obligation to stop it. 
Brands that have every right to their mark for “Bluefood,” their 
“Beach’d” clothing line, their “Pretty Devil” slot machines, and 
their “Devils Nightmare” alcoholic beverages have either been 
forced to spend time and money defending themselves from frivo-
lous claims, or have just abandoned their marks. Duke is rich, pow-
erful, and its lawyers are energetic. But universities should stand for 
careful and correct application of the law and against those who 
would use size or wealth to bully others. Bullying is an emotive 
term, of course, but it accurately describes the actions of an entity 
that has no valid claim but nevertheless uses strength, power, and 
money to achieve its goals. We argued here that there are plausible 
reasons that the combination of a sprawling licensing enterprise and 
the indeterminacies of trademark law could produce bullying behav-
ior as a matter of honest mistake. That in turn teaches us about how 
hard it is to monitor everything that is going on in the “university as 
corporation.” The difficulty of monitoring is central to our most im-
portant conclusion: the university as a mega-brand is straying far 
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from its traditional role in ways that it is not well set-up to police or 
oversee. The stories about Stanford, NYU, Boise State, Texas 
A&M, and The Ohio State University indicate that Duke may not be 
alone in following that path. 
Our study also has policy implications for the law. While we 
think that trademark law generally works well, this study illustrates 
the way in which a few deviations from its core goals, coupled with 
an aggressive business culture of over-assertion, can undermine its 
rationale and threaten both competition and speech. The actions of 
individual trademark owners can seem merely cause for mirth. Yet 
the collective effects of over-assertion of trademarks are serious, 
both in terms of restricting competition and in chilling people from 
engaging in protected speech about the powerful corporate entities 
around them. 
More generally, the academic literature on trademark bullying 
seems to present a clear picture of systemic abuse which demands 
forceful measures to correct. There is no shortage of good ideas for 
reform.134 
As Professor Eric Goldman has pointed out,135 we need better 
data-gathering on examples of trademark bullying, akin to the Lu-
men Database—formerly called the “Chilling Effects” project—that 
keeps track of cease-and-desist letters concerning online content.136 
It is hard to rectify a problem until you understand its full extent. He 
has also suggested more aggressive fee-shifting in clear cases of 
abuse.137 
Professor Leah Grinvald has argued that shaming could be an 
effective pre-litigation method of discouraging bullying.138 This ar-
ticle would presumably qualify. 
 
134 See Kiser, supra note 24, at 245; Dogan, supra note 25, at 1323. 
135 See Goldman, supra note 9. 
136 About Us, LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org/pages/about [https://perma.cc/RN7W-
QZK7]. The project originally focused on copyright take-down notices, and has since 
expanded its database to other complaints, including those premised on trademark, 
defamation, and privacy. 
137 See Goldman, supra note 9. 
138 See Grinvald, supra note 25, at 625. 
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Improvements in machine learning could eventually offer a way 
of providing cheap and high-quality legal information to smaller en-
tities, thus lowering the costs of fighting bullying. 
We should take more seriously the ethical obligations of lawyers 
not to pursue spurious claims. 
There should be a method, either through private action, or ad-
ministrative regulation, of imposing sanctions on repeat, persistent 
offenders. 
Some of these reforms have real promise, though they currently 
face a classic collective action problem—costs are high but spread 
over a large group while benefits redound to a small number of re-
peat players. At the very least, the PTO should return to the issue, 
this time with an empirical study of the quality and frequency of 
oppositions by repeat players. We offer ours as a prototype. 
We think our study also has implications for universities. Are 
universities straying from their core goals? Corporations have a 
straightforward metric for action: maximize shareholder value. Uni-
versities, by contrast, serve many masters—education, research, the 
generation and dissemination of knowledge, the preservation of the 
scholarly commons, the values of free speech and civil debate, the 
interests of the students, faculty, staff and alumni/ae that make up 
the university community. It is possible to imagine a world in which 
a university transforms itself into a mega-brand while, at every 
stage, continuing to respect those values. In that world, the univer-
sity gains extra revenue, raises its visibility and stays true to its core 
mission—a win-win situation. It is also possible, and we would ar-
gue, likely, that in areas ranging from aggressive patent licensing 
practices,139 to the trademark excesses we document here, to large-
scale college athletics,140 universities have lost their way. The latter 
comparison may be particularly revealing. Consider the testimony 
of Sonny Vaccaro to the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Ath-
letics: 
 
139 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 611–12 (2008). 
140 See generally GERALD GURNEY ET AL., UNWINDING MADNESS: WHAT WENT WRONG 
WITH COLLEGE SPORTS—AND HOW TO FIX IT (2017). 
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“I’m not hiding,” Sonny Vaccaro told a closed hear-
ing at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C., in 
2001. “We want to put our materials on the bodies of 
your athletes, and the best way to do that is buy your 
school. Or buy your coach.” Vaccaro’s audience, the 
members of the Knight Commission on Intercolle-
giate Athletics, bristled. These were eminent reform-
ers—among them the president of the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association, two former heads of the 
U.S. Olympic Committee, and several university 
presidents and chancellors…. Not all the members 
could hide their scorn for the “sneaker pimp” of 
schoolyard hustle, who boasted of writing checks for 
millions to everybody in higher education. “Why,” 
asked Bryce Jordan, the president emeritus of Penn 
State, “should a university be an advertising medium 
for your industry?” Vaccaro did not blink. “They 
shouldn’t, sir,” he replied. “You sold your souls, and 
you’re going to continue selling them. You can be 
very moral and righteous in asking me that question, 
sir,” Vaccaro added with irrepressible good cheer, 
“but there’s not one of you in this room that’s going 
to turn down any of our money. You’re going to take 
it. I can only offer it.”141 
Being a trademark bully, in other words, is part of a larger trans-
formation about which universities should think long and hard. 
What is to be done? Our suggestion is a wide-ranging value-audit, 
in which the university asks a group of internal stakeholders and ex-
ternal advisors to assess the coherence of the university’s various 
activities with its multiple missions. There are many possible defi-
nitions of “mission-creep” but a pretty good one is the point at which 
a university claims to be in the business of producing goods and ser-
vices “in virtually all areas of endeavor, to men, women and chil-
dren of all ages.”142 
 
141 Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Oct. 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-
sports/308643/ [https://perma.cc/EJ89-7VT8]. 
142 Opp’n No. 91,241,466 at 11 (filed May 30, 2018). 
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We do not romanticize universities; we work at one. We experi-
ence the quotidian idealistic delight and frequent disillusionment of 
big academe. But we care about universities’ core values. Those val-
ues seem very strange to the larger society. Why study unpopular 
ideas? Why care passionately about the truth, even when it doesn’t 
pay? They are also profoundly fragile. It is possible, of course, that 
an institution could cherish those values and also become a com-
mercial mega-brand culture with a dubious connection to veracity. 
We would not take that bet. 
Right now, Duke is an anomaly. Will it be one in the future? 
Perhaps in the domain of trademark oppositions. As we have tried 
to demonstrate, many of Duke’s trademark oppositions are expen-
sive, legally ungrounded and, while interfering with the legitimate 
businesses of others, produce little for Duke beyond bad publicity. 
But what about the wider attempts to use baseless intellectual prop-
erty claims to police activities universities do not like? There we 
think that Duke’s aggressiveness might represent the future. We 
fear, in fact, that Duke is boldly bullying where many universities 
will eventually follow. We hope this Article sounds a warning. 
Universities should not be trademark bullies, or for that matter, 
copyright or patent trolls. If they do not remember this fact, will ath-
letic shoe licensing revenue, satisfaction from stopping an unrelated 
business from gaining marks they have every right to, claiming own-
ership of the definite article, or preventing fictional portrayals of 
sexually active or larcenous students compensate for the loss? We 
doubt it. To our university we would quote another Duke (Elling-
ton), “A problem is a chance for you to do your best.”143 And, no, 
we don’t own his name either. 
Earlier, we mentioned “the preservation of the scholarly com-
mons” as one of a university’s core goals. At the time of writing, 
Duke had filed one more trademark. It is over the phrase “Scholarly 
Commons.”144 That is exquisite irony, of course. But, as our study 
 
143 ASHTON APPLEWHITE ET AL., AND I QUOTE: THE DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF QUOTES, 
SAYINGS, AND JOKES FOR THE CONTEMPORARY SPEECHMAKER 57 (2d ed. 2003). 
144 See U.S. Trademark Serial No. 87,946,903 (filed June 4, 2018). The term “scholarly 
commons” is widely used by a national community of institutional academic repositories 
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The starting point for this project was the public database of pro-
ceedings before the TTAB.145 Searching “Duke” yields its filings. 
We compiled a database of information regarding over 800 proceed-
ings filed by Duke from 2015-2018, including 136 opposition or 
cancellation proceedings.146 
We prepared analyses of recurring issues. Section 2(d) of the 
Lanham Act allows challenges to marks that “so resemble[] a mark 
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade 
name previously used in the United States by another and not aban-
doned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods 
of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to de-
ceive.”147 There are elaborate, competing tests for likelihood of con-
fusion. Our methodology focused on three factors that would be cen-
tral to the analysis before both the PTO or Fourth Circuit (where 
Duke is located)—the strength of Duke’s relevant marks, the simi-
larity of Duke’s and the applicant’s marks, and the proximity of the 
 
who, we predict, would be mightily displeased to see Duke claiming ownership of it. See 
Search of Scholarly Commons, GOOGLE (Jan. 8, 2021, 1:05 PM), 
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=%22scholarly+commons%22 
[https://perma.cc/9JR3-S6ZS]. There are reasons to use trademark law to protect a 
commons. Creative Commons does so, to prevent people falsely claiming to be providing 
Creative Commons licenses. But while trademarks can protect the commons, they can also 
be used—wrongly—to expropriate portions of it. 
145 See Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Inquiry System, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ [https://perma.cc/8UQX-9UKW]. 
146 The publicly available documents we reviewed were sometimes incomplete or 
ambiguous, with conflicting designations. We have made every effort to double-check our 
findings but cannot exclude the possibility of the PTO’s data being inaccurate in some 
cases. Having said that, the overall picture remains clear. 
147 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). 
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respective goods or services.148 (Where relevant, however, we also 
analyzed other factors, such as bad faith or actual confusion.) 
 
148 Circuits have formulated different multi-factor tests for likelihood of confusion that 
have similar, but not identical, factors. The PTO relies on the so-called DuPont factors, 
which are: 
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to 
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. 
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services 
as described in an application or registration or in connection with 
which a prior mark is in use. 
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue 
trade channels. 
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, 
i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing. 
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use). 
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods. 
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion. 
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has 
been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion. 
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, 
“family” mark, product mark). 
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior 
mark. 
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from 
use of its mark on its goods. 
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or 
substantial. 
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use. 
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The PTO 
explains that the “key considerations” are the first and second factors above. U.S. PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1207.01 (Oct. 
2018), available at https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current#/current/TMEP-
1200d1e5036.html [https://perma.cc/HPZ9-U53T]. However, Duke is located in North 
Carolina, in the 4th Circuit, and if a case were litigated there, the factors would be the seven 
factors outlined by the 4th Circuit in Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 
1527 (4th Cir. 1984):  
1) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark; 
2) the similarity of the two marks; 
3) the similarity of the goods/services the marks identify; 
4) the similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their businesses; 
5) the similarity of the advertising used by the two parties; 
6) the defendant’s intent; 
7) actual confusion. 
In practice, both the courts and the PTO focus on the similarity of the marks and the 
proximity of the goods or services they identify, and it is on those factors, along with 
strength of the prior mark, that our analysis concentrated. 
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We standardized recurring issues concerning Duke’s particular 
intellectual property portfolio, including the strength and distinc-
tiveness of Duke’s various marks (for example, “Duke”, “Devil,” 
“Blue Devil,” “D,” and “Blue”), the law on single-letter marks (for 
Duke’s “D” based claims), and the proximity of Duke’s marks to 
those it regularly targets, including alcoholic beverages, sports 
drinks, and restaurant services. We also applied uniform analyses of 
whether the “Duke” marks are famous for dilution purposes, and 
section 2(a)’s bar on registering marks that “falsely suggest a con-
nection with… institutions.”149 Using these rubrics, our research 
team coded the oppositions and cancellations on the following four-
point scale. 
(1) Clearly Erroneous: completely ungrounded as a matter of ex-
isting law. 
(2) Far-fetched: unlikely to prevail. 
(3) Arguable: existing trademark doctrine presents reasons why 
the application might, or might not, succeed, but Duke has some 
good arguments. 
(4) Sound: the opposition was well-grounded in existing trade-
mark law and Duke would prevail were the matter to be litigated. 
Because the initial coding would be performed by multiple peo-
ple, we shared examples of the classification metric from each year, 
together with accompanying legal reasoning, to ensure consistency. 
Finally, the authors reviewed each assessment, recoding if neces-
sary. We wish again to express our gratitude to our four superb re-
search assistants, Matt Gibbons, Michael Dale, Joe Bianco and 
Anupam Dalvi. Thanks go also to Balfour Smith, the Program Co-
ordinator at the Center for the Study of the Public Domain. His work 
on data analysis and visualization was invaluable. The authors are 
solely responsible for any errors and for the views put forward here. 
They do not, of course, speak on behalf of Duke University. 
 
 
149 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1203.03(c) (Oct. 2018). 
